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Modelling stance adverbs in grammatical theory: tackling heterogeneity with Functional Discourse Grammar

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ABSTRACT

In many linguistic approaches and theories, a distinction is made between adverbs that are propositional (representational, ideational, referential), and adverbs that are non-propositional (interpersonal, (inter)subjective, evaluative, parenthetical); i.e. between what is said (the proposition expressed) and a speaker's stance on what is said (e.g. the speaker's attitude towards, evaluation of, or commitment to the message conveyed). As is well-known, however, the latter group, including such diverse adverbs as *briefly*, *frankly*, *sadly*, *allegedly*, *hopefully*, *probably*, *obviously* and *cleverly*, differ substantially in terms of their discourse-pragmatic or semantic function, truth-conditionality and syntactic and prosodic behaviour. This paper addresses the question of whether, given this functional and formal heterogeneity, it is helpful, or even possible, to recognize a category of stance adverbs. It is argued that our understanding of these adverbs will benefit from a stricter application of very specific functional and formal criteria, allowing for the distinction of a number of well-defined subclasses of adverbs with partly overlapping, but nevertheless defining functional and formal properties. Subsequently, it is demonstrated how the theory of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG), a theory characterized by a "form-oriented, function-to-form" approach (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008: 38–39), making use of different levels and layers of linguistic analysis, can be used to bring out both the similarities and the differences between the various subclasses of stance adverbs without having to resort to a single dichotomy (e.g. ideational vs. interpersonal; truth-conditional vs. non-truth-conditional, propositional vs. non-propositional; parenthetical vs. non-parenthetical). In addition, it is shown how important concepts and distinctions in the literature on (inter)subjectivity, such as the distinction between semantic and pragmatic subjectivity, and between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, can be dealt with within the framework of FDG.

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1. Introduction

In many linguistic approaches and theories, particularly those that are functionally or cognitively oriented, a distinction is made between adverbs that are propositional (representational, ideational, referential, adjunctive), and adverbs that are non-propositional (interpersonal, (inter)subjective, evaluative, parenthetical, disjunctive); i.e. between what is said (the proposition expressed) and a speaker's comments on what is said (e.g. the speaker's stance on, attitude towards, evaluation of, or commitment to the message conveyed). As is well-known, however, the group of stance adverbs, including such diverse

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adverbs as *briefly, frankly, sadly, allegedly, hopefully, probably, obviously* and *cleverly*, is far from homogeneous, not only when it comes to their exact discourse-pragmatic or semantic function, but also in terms of their truth-conditionality and their syntactic and prosodic features.

This paper will address the question of whether, given this functional and formal heterogeneity, it is helpful, or even possible, to define a category of stance adverbs (and, by extension, of stance expressions in general).¹ It will be argued that rather than relying on ill-defined notions like stance adverbs, our understanding of the adverbs in question will benefit from a stricter application of a number of well-defined functional and formal criteria. This, it will be shown, will result in the distinction of a number of well-defined subclasses of adverbs with partly overlapping, but nevertheless distinctive functional and formal properties, which together make up ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, Section 66).

For the purpose of this classification, use will be made of the theory of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG), a theory that is characterized by a ‘form-oriented, function-to-form’ approach (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 38–39; Keizer, 2015, pp. 14–15) and that makes use of different, interactive levels and layers of linguistic analysis. On the basis of a number of specific functional and formal criteria, each subclass of stance adverbs will be assigned to a particular layer of representation. Such an analysis, it will be argued, may help to bring out both the similarities and the differences between them without having to resort to a single dichotomy (representational (ideational) vs. interpersonal; truth-conditional vs. non-truth-conditional, propositional vs. non-propositional; syntactically parenthetical vs. syntactically non-parenthetical). In addition, it will be made clear how important concepts and distinctions in the literature on (inter)subjectivity, such as the distinction between semantic and pragmatic subjectivity, and between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, are dealt with within the framework of FDG.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the notions stance and subjectivity in general, and the heterogeneity involved in these notions. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to Functional Discourse Grammar; particular attention is paid to those aspects of the theory relevant to the analysis of stance adverbs, such as the different levels and layers of representation. Subsequently, Section 4 introduces and applies the various criteria (discourse-pragmatic, semantic, syntactic and prosodic) used for assigning a particular subgroup of adverbs to a particular level and layer of analysis. In this section, use is made of data retrieved from two corpora of contemporary English (the British National Corpus (Davies, 2004) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008)), with occasional examples from the NOW Corpus (Davies, 2016) and the LDC Fisher Corpus (Cieri et al., 2004). Section 5 demonstrates how the different subclasses of stance verbs are analysed within FDG. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Stance expressions: a heterogeneous group

2.1. Different kinds of subjectivity

Over the past few decades, it has become generally accepted that linguistic communication does not only (and in many cases not even primarily) consist in expressing propositional content, but that every linguistic utterance also involves conveying a speaker’s stance, i.e. her point of view on the propositions expressed (objective expression of content vs. subjective expression of self; e.g. Benveniste, 1971, pp. 225; Lyons, 1982, pp. 102, 105; Traugott, 1989, 2010; Hunston and Thompson, 2000; Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Scheibmann, 2002, 2007; Du Bois, 2007; Cuyckens et al., 2010; Ginzburg, 2012). Recognizing the importance of subjective expression in linguistic communication, Lyons (1982, pp. 102), in a much cited passage, defines the term subjectivity as ‘the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself and of his attitudes and beliefs’. Building on Lyons’ characterization, Traugott (2010, pp. 32) defines expressions of subjectivity as expressions ‘the prime semantic or pragmatic meaning of which is to index speaker attitude or viewpoint’. This notion of subjectivity can also be found in studies analysing stance in spontaneous conversation (Schiffrin, 1990; Scheibman, 2002; Du Bois, 2007; Ginzburg, 2012). Scheibmann (2002, p. 1), for instance, observes that ‘[i]n English conversation, participants are not simply, nor very often really, reporting on events that take place in the world in an unmediated manner’, but consistently convey their ‘evaluations, opinions, and attitudes – in short, their points of view – constrained by the exigencies of face-to-face communication’.

Although the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in language is a crucial one, it will be clear that these definitions of the notions of subjectivity and stance are rather vague and, consequently, very broad. Many authors have indeed pointed out that the group of subjectivity markers (or stance expressions) is extremely heterogeneous (e.g. Scheibman, 2002, p. 1; 2007, p. 119; Du Bois, 2007, pp. 139, 144–145; Traugott, 2010, p. 32), and that the concept as a whole is, as yet, still ill-understood (e.g. De Smet and Verstraete, 2006; Du Bois, 2007). Indeed, the by now extensive literature on subjectivity has shown that not only is there a large diversity in the form a subjective expression can take (from morphemes to words, phrases and entire clauses), but, in addition, that these expressions may serve a wide range of interactive functions, including epistemic and deontic modality, evidentiality, evaluation, attitude, style, emotion (affective stance), alignment (agreement), generalization, information structure, connectivity (discourse organization), hedging, intensification, politeness, as well as

¹ The decision to restrict the discussion in this paper to adverbs ending in *-ly* was taken for purely practical reasons (to enhance comparability between the stance expressions). The analyses proposed can, however, also be applied to more complex stance expressions (phrases and clauses).

deictic functions (Traugott and Dasher, 2002, p. 23; Traugott, 2003a, p. 125; Traugott, 2003b, pp. 633-634; Traugott, 2010, p. 32; see also Cuyckens et al., 2010, pp. 8, 12).

What complicates matters further is that, cutting through all these forms and uses, a few more distinctions have been introduced to make sense of the notion of subjectivity. One such distinction is that between semantic and pragmatic subjectivity, which plays an important role in the work of Traugott (e.g. Traugott, 1989; see also Traugott and Dasher, 2002; Traugott and Trousdale, 2013). Much of the subjectivity found in communication takes the form of pragmatic inferences, in which case the subjective meaning is not coded in the linguistic expression used, but may arise in a particular context. Such 'pragmatic subjectivity' is ubiquitous, as even elements that are normally regarded as objective (descriptive adjectives like *American*) may be used by a speaker to express subjective meaning. These pragmatic inferences (basically Grice's (1975) conversational implicatures) are not regarded as being part of the language system: they are not conventional(ized) and cannot be learned (see also De Smet and Verstraete, 2006, pp. 384-385). What Traugott is interested in is 'semantic subjectivity', which requires the presence of a systematic, conventional relation between the meaning and the form of the element in question. Diachronically, such semantic subjectivity typically arises from pragmatic inferences through a process of subjectification; for a new linguistic item to emerge, however, these (contextually dependent) inferences need to be reanalysed as explicitly coded (semanticized) subjective meaning (e.g. Traugott and Dasher, 2002, pp. 21-22; Traugott, 2010, p. 32). In a similar vein, Scheibman (2002, p. 1) addresses the question of criterial formal changes, as well as the systematicity of the function-form relation.

Elaborating on the difference between pragmatic and semantic subjectivity, De Smet and Verstraete (2006) distinguish two types of semantic subjectivity. Following Halliday and Hasan (1976) and Halliday and Matthiessen (2014), they recognize that semantically subjective elements may be both interpersonal and ideational in nature.² Ideational elements are used to represent some aspect of the extra-linguistic world; they 'construe human experience' (e.g. Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 30; original emphasis). Interpersonal elements, on the other hand, are used to express the speaker's attitude either towards the propositional content conveyed (the personal aspect of an utterance) or to whoever she is talking to (the interactive aspect of an utterance) (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 30). At both these levels (or in both these metafunctions, in Halliday and Matthiessen's terminology), De Smet and Verstraete (2006) argue, we can find examples of semantic subjectivity. When, for instance, an originally objective adjective (e.g. Dutch *leuk* 'lukewarm') develops an evaluative meaning ('pleasant, nice'), and this meaning becomes conventionalized (even outing all previous meanings), we are, according to De Smet & Verstraete, dealing with a case of semantic subjectification. The new meaning, however, is still ideational, in the sense that it is restrictive (and as such propositional); moreover, the new adjective behaves in all respects like any other ideational adjective. In other cases, however, subjectification of an objective adjective (e.g. (Belgian) Dutch *dom*, from 'dumb' to 'stupid, bloody') results in a non-restrictive meaning, accompanied by deviant syntactic behaviour in terms of gradability, modification, predictability and coordination. In this case, De Smet & Verstraete conclude, we are dealing with interpersonal semantic subjectivity. This means that De Smet & Verstraete use a different criterion for semantic subjectivity than Traugott; whereas Traugott emphasizes the need for conventionalization accompanied by distinctive formal features (coded semantic meaning, leading to reanalysis), for De Smet & Verstraete, conventionalization of subjective meaning alone may suffice for obtaining semantic subjectivity (as in the case of the subjectified, but still ideational use of *leuk*).

Finally, almost all recent studies on the notion of (pragmatic or semantic) subjectivity also mention the notion of intersubjectivity. What the two notions have in common is that they both 'involve the reanalysis as coded meanings of pragmatic meanings arising in the context of speaker-hearer negotiation of meaning' (Traugott, 2010, p. 60); however, whereas '[s]ubjectification is the development of meanings that express speaker attitude or viewpoint, ... intersubjectification is the development of the speaker's attention to addressee self-image' (Traugott, 2010, p. 60),³ or, as Traugott and Dasher (2002, p. 6) put it, subjective meanings 'express grounding in the SP/W's perspective explicitly', while intersubjective meanings 'express grounding in the relationship between speaker/writer and addressee/reader explicitly'. What is important is that, as in the case of subjectivity, intersubjectivity requires the presence of a stable form-meaning pairing; for a meaning to be fully intersubjective it needs to be conventionalized and formally coded (e.g. Traugott and Dasher, 2002, pp. 21-22; Traugott, 2010, p. 37). Moreover, since diachronically intersubjectivity always follows subjectivity (i.e. the presence of intersubjective meaning always presupposes the presence of subjective meaning; e.g. Traugott and Dasher, 2002, p. 40; Traugott, 2010, p. 34), there will always be fewer cases of fully-fledged, semanticized intersubjectivity in a language than there are cases of semantic subjectivity. According to Traugott, truly intersubjectified meanings are rare in a language like English (unlike in Japanese, with its system of dedicated honorifics).⁴

There is no doubt that each of these distinctions (between semantic and pragmatic subjectivity; ideational and interpersonal subjectivity; subjectivity and intersubjectivity; (inter)subjectivity and (inter)subjectification) do indeed contribute to a better understanding of the notion of subjectivity. In this paper I will argue, however, that our understanding of these distinctions may benefit from subsuming them into a unified theory of grammar, which allows them to be defined and applied consistently in relation to the rest of theory, and which makes it possible to capture the interaction between them in

² Unlike, for instance, Traugott (2010, p. 34), who equates ideational with non-/less subjective, and interpersonal with subjective/intersubjective.

³ For similar definitions of intersubjectivity, see Scheibmann (2002, pp. 111, 113) and Du Bois (2007, p. 140).

⁴ Traugott (2010, p. 37) suggests that some uses of *well*, *perhaps* and *sort of* can be regarded as cases of intersubjectification in English.

an insightful manner. In this paper, the class of stance adverbs will be used to illustrate how this (or some of this) may be achieved.

2.2. English stance adverbs

The aim of this study is to find a consistent and coherent way of characterizing, classifying and analysing a number of different stance adverbs, including *briefly*, *frankly*, *sadly*, *allegedly*, *hopefully*, *probably*, *obviously* and *cleverly*, when used at the clausal level.⁵ At first sight, these adverbs seem to form a relatively well-delineated group of elements: they are very similar in form (adverbs in *-ly*), and they are all subjective (expressing the speaker's point of view with regard to the message conveyed). In reality, however, just like stance expressions in general, we are dealing with a highly heterogeneous group. First of all, these adverbs serve very diverse discourse-pragmatic and semantic functions (e.g. stylistic, illocutionary, attitudinal, hearsay, volitional, epistemic, evidential and evaluative); i.e. they differ in terms of their object of stance (Du Bois, 2007, pp. 148-149), and may be said to modify ("scope over") different aspects of the utterance.

Moreover, some of these adverbs have been classified in the literature as parenthetical, peripheral, disjunctive or non-propositional (and as such non-truth-conditional and, typically, prosodically non-integrated; e.g. *frankly*, *sadly*, *allegedly*), whereas others are typically regarded as sentential, adjunctive or propositional (and as such truth-conditional and typically prosodically integrated; e.g. *hopefully*, *probably* and evaluative ("subject-oriented") adverbs like *cleverly*).

Finally, we find that some stance adverbs have been claimed to be grammatical expressions of subjectivity (e.g. *frankly*), others as lexical (e.g. *probably*; see Cuyckens et al., 2010, p. 11); and although most only express subjective meaning, some might be said to also have developed intersubjective meaning (e.g. *frankly*). As for the difference between semantic and pragmatic subjectivity, even if we restrict ourselves to the former (i.e. to coded instances of subjectivity), we find that the various groups of stance adverbs exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity, displaying very diverse syntactic and prosodic behaviour, with no formal properties characterizing the group as a whole.

So what exactly is it that stance adverbs have in common? Are there any features (functional and/or formal) that can be regarded as defining features of the category? Do these adverbs, for instance, share particular discourse-pragmatic or semantic functions, and/or do they exhibit specific formal behaviour (in terms of a number of syntactic criteria, as well as preferred prosodic realization). Identifying such properties alone, however, will not be enough; in addition, we need to address the question of how all these properties interact, and how they fit into the linguistic system as a whole. In other words, rather than concentrating on one or more two-fold distinctions, we need to look at the entire system of partly overlapping, but nevertheless distinctive functional and formal properties. It will be argued that such an approach, especially when embedded in a coherent theoretical framework, will help to reduce the degree of elusiveness involved in defining the notion of stance, as it will allow for a systematic and insightful analysis of different subclasses of stance adverbs, capturing the similarities and differences between them; an analysis, moreover, which is not restricted to adverbs, but which can be extended to other types of subjective expressions.

The analysis of different sub-classes of stance adverbs will be presented in Section 4. First, however, Section 3 will provide a brief outline of the theory used for this analysis, Functional Discourse Grammar.

3. A brief outline of Functional Discourse Grammar

3.1. Overall characterization

As a functional theory, Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG, Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008) is interested in the relation between the function of linguistic expressions and the form they appear in. More specifically, FDG takes a 'function-to-form' approach, both synchronically and diachronically. Synchronically, this is mirrored in the top-down orientation of the model, taking as its input a speaker's communicative intentions, which, through processing formulation and encoding (see below), lead to a specific linguistic form. Diachronically, this function-to-form approach is reflected in 'the belief that the properties of linguistic utterances are adapted to those communicative aims which the language user, in interaction with other language users, seeks to achieve by using those utterances' (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 29, with reference to Dik, 1986). At the same time, however, FDG is 'form-oriented', in that it only seeks to account for those pragmatic and semantic phenomena that are reflected in the morphosyntactic and phonological form of an utterance (e.g. Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 39, 40). This means that when it comes to the representation of subjective expressions, FDG only represents what Traugott refers to as 'semantic' (or conventionalized) subjectivity, with 'pragmatic' (contextual) subjectivity being regarded as arising from the interplay between grammar and context (see below).⁶

⁵ That is, the use of this adverbs within phrases (e.g. *a frankly disgusting habit*, *this possibly dangerous strategy*) will not be discussed here.

⁶ Note, however, that the terminology used is somewhat different, since FDG uses the term pragmatic also for conventionalized interpersonal meanings (see Section 3.2.1).

So how are these general characteristics reflected in the organization of the model? First of all, as we have seen, the model is organized in a top-down manner, starting with the Speaker's communicative intention, and from there working its way down to articulation. In this way, 'FDG takes the functional approach to language to its logical extreme', as pragmatics is taken to govern semantics, pragmatics and semantics to govern morphosyntax, and pragmatics, semantics, and morphosyntax to govern phonology (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 13). Note that this approach also lends itself very well to a description of the processes of subjectification and intersubjectification, which, as Traugott (2010, p. 55) points out, can only be understood if we take the perspective of the speaker (writer).

The privileged role of pragmatics is further reflected in the fact that FDG takes as its basic unit of analysis not the sentence or the clause (a morphosyntactic unit), but the Discourse Act (a communicative unit; see also below). This means that FDG can accommodate not only regular clauses, but also units larger than the clause, such as complex sentences, and units smaller than the clause, such as interjections or single phrases.

In order to represent all linguistic information relevant for the formation of a linguistic expression, FDG analyses Discourse Acts in terms of independent pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic and phonological modules, which interact to produce the appropriate linguistic expression. Together, these four levels, and the primitives feeding into these levels, form the grammatical component of the model (the FDG proper). This component, however, does not operate in isolation, but forms part of an overall model of verbal communication. Thus, in accordance with the basic principles of the functional approach, the grammatical component interacts with a contextual component, containing non-linguistic information about the immediate discourse context that affects the form of a linguistic utterance (see also Connolly, 2007, 2014; Cornish, 2009; Alturo et al., 2014; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2014). Finally, in order to capture the interaction between the production of a linguistic expression and the Speaker's communicative intentions, the grammatical component also interacts with a conceptual component, which contains the prelinguistic conceptual information relevant for the production of a linguistic expression, and which forms the driving force behind the grammatical component (see e.g. Connolly, 2017). A general outline of the model is given in Fig. 1.

3.2. Four levels of analysis

3.2.1. The interpersonal and representational levels

The four levels of representation are the outcome of two types of operations: formulation, which deals with meaning, and encoding, dealing with form. The first two levels, representing pragmatic and semantic aspects of a linguistic expression, are the outcome of the operation of Formulation. The operation of encoding subsequently takes care of an expression's morphosyntactic and phonological properties. Each of the four levels is hierarchically organized into a number of different layers. The highest level of representation is the Interpersonal Level (IL), which deals with 'all the formal aspects of a linguistic unit that reflect its role in the interaction between the Speaker and the Addressee' (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 46). The most inclusive layer at this level is the Move (M), which forms 'the largest unit of interaction relevant to grammatical analysis' (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 50). Each Move consists of one or more Discourse Acts (A), defined as 'the smallest identifiable units of communicative behaviour'; unlike Moves, these 'do not necessarily further the communication in terms of approaching a conversational goal' (Kroon, 1995, p. 85; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 60). These Discourse Acts, in turn, consist of an Illocution (F), the Speech Participants (P₁ and P₂) and a Communicated Content (C), where the Communicated Content 'contains the totality of what the Speaker wishes to evoke in his/her communication with the Addressee' (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 87).⁷

Each of these layers is provided with a slot for operators and modifiers, providing additional grammatical and lexical information, respectively, about the layer in question. For distinguishing between operators and modifiers, FDG relies on two criteria: modifiability (modifiers can themselves be modified, operators cannot); and focality (modifiers can be focalized, operators cannot).⁸ All adverbs discussed in this paper are analysed as modifiers, as they can be both focalized and modified (see Keizer, 2007; Hengeveld, 2017). Adverbs can, however, also function as operators, e.g. in the case of grammatical(ized) elements such as *just/only* when used to mitigate the force of the Illocution, or *truly* as an intensifier.

Modifiers at the Interpersonal Level often take the form of subjective adverbs, which are necessarily speaker-bound and non-truth-conditional (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2018, pp. 130, 144). Different groups of interpersonal adverbs are distinguished, which, depending on both their function and their formal behaviour (see below), are analysed as belonging to (scoping over) different interpersonal layers. Adverbs like *(un)fortunately* and *(un)surprisingly*, for instance, expressing the

⁷ The Communicated Content, in turn, consists of one or more Subacts of Reference (R), evoking entities, and Subacts of Ascription (T), evoking the properties the Speaker wishes to assign to these entities. Since this paper does not discuss phrase internal adverbs, these Subacts will not be included in the analyses.

⁸ Note that the use of two criteria also leads to the distinction of a third group of additional element, that are focalizable but not modifiable (lexical operators; see Keizer, 2007; Hengeveld, 2017).




Fig. 1. General layout of FDG (based on Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008: 13).

speaker's attitude with regard to what is communicated, are analysed as modifiers of the layer of Communicated Content, as illustrated in the following example:

- (1) a. my parents *unsurprisingly* did not accept my argument. (COCA, fiction)
 b. (M_i: (A_i: [(F_i: DECL (F_i)) (P_i)_S (P_i)_A (C_i: [...] (C_i): unsurprisingly (C_i))] (A_i)) (M_i))

In (1b) we find a Move, consisting of a single Discourse Act, which in turn consists of a declarative Illocution, the two Speech Participants, and a Communicated Content. The Communicated Content is modified by the attitudinal adverb *unsurprisingly*.

The Representational Level (RL) deals with the semantic aspects of a linguistic expression, i.e. with those aspects of a linguistic expression that reflect the way in which language relates to the (real or imagined) world it describes (cf. Halliday & Hasan's (1976) ideational metafunction). The units at this level represent the different linguistically relevant types of entities in the extra-linguistic world (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008; cf. Lyons, 1977, pp. 442-447). The highest layer at this level is

that of the Propositional Content (p), which represents a mental construct which can be evaluated in terms of its truth. The Propositional Content consists of one or more Episodes (ep), i.e. sets of States-of-Affairs (e) that are coherent in terms of time, space and participants. Each State-of-Affairs is in turn characterized by a Configurational Property (f^c), typically consisting of a verb (analysed as a verbal Property) and its arguments.

Once again each layer is provided with a slot for operators and modifiers, the former expressing grammatical information (e.g. tense, aspect, modality or number), the latter providing additional lexical information concerning the layer in question. Representational modifiers often take the form of lower-layer adverbs, and are typically truth-conditional. The clearest examples are adverbs that are part of the predication, e.g. manner adverbs (modifying a Lexical (verbal) Property), frequency adverbs (modifying the State-of-Affairs) and time adverbs (modifying the Episode); modal and evidential adverbs like *probably* or *evidently* (modifying the Propositional Content) are also included in the set of representational adverbs. Note that although these adverbs can be speaker-bound (e.g. modal adverbs when the subject of the clause is first person), this need not be the case (an adverb like *probably* can also be used to express other people's degree of commitment to the truth of the Propositional Content, as in *Pat believes that Jane probably won't come tonight*, where the epistemic adverb expresses Pat's degree of commitment, not the speaker's).

A Representational Level analysis of the sentence in (2a) is provided in (2b):⁹.

- (2) a. his opinions *probably* do not reflect the law. (BYU-BNC, academic)
 b. (p_i: (pres ep_i: (neg e_i: (f_i: [...] (f_i)) (e_i)) (ep_i)) (p_i): probable (p_i))

The highest layer of analysis here is the Propositional Content p_i. This Propositional Content contains a single Episode ep_i, which in turn consists of a single States-of-Affairs e_i. This State-of-Affairs is headed by a Configurational Property f_i, consisting of the verb *reflect* and its two arguments (not represented). The representation further contains the negation operator 'neg' at the layer of the State-of-Affairs, the tense operator 'pres' at the layer of the Episode, and the modifier *probabl* at the layer of the Propositional Contents.

Finally, the layered structure of the two higher levels, and the fact that modifiers are assigned to a particular layer of analysis, allows for predictions about which adverbs can occur in which verbal complements. On the assumption that different types of verbs take different layers as their clausal complement (i.e. have different selectional or subcategorizational properties), there are constraints on the occurrence of adverbs in the clausal complement of a verb in the sense that a complement cannot contain adverbs that function as modifiers at a higher layer than that of the complement itself (see also Hengeveld, 1990, pp. 16–17; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 363–365; cf. Ramat and Ricca, 1998, p. 222; Bach, 1999, p. 358; Potts, 2005, pp. 145–45). For instance, since verbs of knowing take a Propositional Content as their complement, these complements can contain propositional modifiers like *probably* in (3), but not (or at least not felicitously) higher-layer adverbials, like *reportedly* (which modifies the Communicated Content):

- (3) Somebody back there was smart enough to know that Nairam *probably* (**reportedly*) had the line tapped. (COCA, fiction; adapted)

3.2.2. The morphosyntactic and Phonological Levels

The output of the operation of formulation forms the input to the operation of encoding. The first level of encoding, the Morphosyntactic Level, accounts for all the linear properties of a linguistic expression, using the same placement rules for clauses, phrases and complex words. These placement rules are functionally inspired, applying in a top-down, outside-in manner, with operators, modifiers and functions belonging to the highest layer at the Interpersonal Level (that of the Move) being the first ones to be assigned a position (typically in the periphery of the clause), and those from the innermost layer at the Representational Level (the Property) being assigned a position last (ending up in the more central positions). In the case of multiple modifiers this means that higher adverbs are more likely to be placed in more peripheral (typically pre-verbal) positions, and lower adverbs in more central or post-verbal positions. By way of illustration, consider the following example:

- (4) She will *unfortunately probably* leave for Brazil *again tomorrow*.

Cross-linguistically, languages make use of one or more (up to four) absolute positions for the placement of (in this case clausal) elements. English has three absolute positions: an initial, a medial and a final position. As soon as one of these positions is filled, one or two relative positions are created. In example (4), the attitudinal adverb *unfortunately*, as the only interpersonal modifier, is the first element to be placed, going to the absolute medial position. The adverb *probably*, as the highest representational modifier, is the next element to be placed, going to a newly available relative position immediately following *unfortunately*. Next the Episode modifier *tomorrow* is placed in the absolute clause-final position, and the frequency adverb *again* in the newly created pre-final position.

Finally, the Phonological Level converts the input from the three higher levels into phonological form. Once again the layers at this level are hierarchically organized. The highest layer, the Utterance (u) consists of one or more Intonational

⁹ For the sake of simplicity, the internal structure of the Configurational Content has not been represented.

Phrases (P), which in turn consist of Phonological Phrases (PP) (which divide into Phonological Words, which are made up of Feet, which contain Syllables). The layer that is most relevant for the current discussion is that of the Intonational Phrase, which, in the default case, corresponds to a Discourse Act at the Interpersonal Level. Intonational Phrases are characterized internally by the presence of a complete intonational contour, and externally by the presence of intonational boundaries.

4. Analysing stance adverbs in Functional Discourse Grammar

4.1. Criteria for analysis

In this section, it will be shown how FDG, with its hierarchically organized layers at different levels of analysis, can be used to bring out the differences and similarities between the different kinds of stance adverbs. We will start by considering the specific discourse-pragmatic and semantic function(s) these adverbs can serve (e.g. Fraser, 1996; Biber et al., 1999; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014). On the basis of these functions the adverbs will be assigned to a particular interpersonal or representational layer, which is regarded as the scope of the adverb. This analysis may thus be regarded as a more fine-grained version of Traugott and Dasher's (2002, p. 40) three-fold distinction between elements scoping over part of the proposition, over the proposition or over the discourse (Section 4.2). Next we will consider the notion of truth-conditionality, which will provide further information as to the level of analysis (interpersonal vs. representational/ideational) (Section 4.3).

Subsequently, in accordance with the function-to form approach of the model, the formal features of these adverbs will be investigated (differences in syntactic behaviour in terms of e.g. clefting, questioning, scope of pronominalization and ellipsis, their (absolute and relative) clausal position, their distribution in embedded contexts, as well as constraints on modification, comparison and coordination) to see to the extent to which these features justify the higher level analysis proposed (Section 4.4). Finally, we will briefly consider the prosodic features of these adverbs, in particular their prosodic (non-)integration (Section 4.5).

4.2. Discourse-pragmatic and semantic functions

Various studies have offered classifications of subjective adverbs based on the discourse-pragmatic or semantic functions they perform (e.g. Jackendoff, 1972; Bellert, 1977; Powell, 1992; Fraser, 1996; Biber et al., 1999; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014). Functional Discourse Grammar is no exception and distinguishes a number of subclasses of stance adverbs, each of which is associated with a particular layer of analysis. Thus, discourse-organizational (textual) adverbs like *briefly*, *finally* or *additionally* are taken to scope over the highest layers of analysis: either a Move or a single Discourse Act within a Move. An adverb like *sadly*, when used to express the speaker's state-of-mind while producing an utterance, is regarded as modifying the Discourse Act, while an Illocutionary adverb like *frankly* is analysed as scoping over the Illocution. Adverbs expressing a speaker's attitude towards the message conveyed modify the Communicated Content ((*un*)*fortunately*, (*un*)*surprisingly*, etc.); hearsay adverbs like *reportedly* and *supposedly*, serving as indications that the speaker is relaying someone else's point of view, are also taken to belong to this layer.

At the highest representational layer, the Propositional Content, we find operators expressing subjective epistemic modality, like *probably*, indicating the kind or degree of speaker commitment to the Propositional Content (Hengeveld, 1988, 1989, p. 151, 1997, p. 129; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 153-154; Dik, 1997, p. 240); at this layer we also find the group of inferential evidential adverbs (e.g. *apparently* and *evidently* when used to indicate that the speaker has inferred a certain piece of information on the basis of his/her own existing knowledge; Hengeveld & Dall'Aglio Hattner, 2015, p. 485; Kemp, 2018) and the volitive (boulomaic) adverb *hopefully*. The next layer, that of the Episode, is the domain of objective epistemic modality (as expressed by *maybe* and *perhaps*; see Keizer, 2018a), describing the degree of likeliness that an Episode takes place, as well as of deductive evidential adverbs (e.g. *apparently* and *evidently* when used to indicate that the information presented by the speaker is deduced on the basis of perceptual evidence; cf. Hengeveld & Dall'Aglio Hattner, 2015, p. 486). Finally, there is the group of evaluative adverbs (more commonly referred to as subject-oriented adverbs), which, as

Table 1
Subclasses of subjective adverbs and their layer of analysis.

| Function | Examples | Layer |
|---|--|--|
| discourse-organizational/ stylistic | <i>finally</i> , <i>briefly</i> , <i>additionally</i> | Move or Discourse Act |
| state-of-mind | <i>sadly</i> | Discourse Act |
| illocutionary | <i>frankly</i> , <i>honestly</i> , <i>sincerely</i> | Illocution |
| attitudinal | (<i>un</i>) <i>fortunately</i> , <i>surprisingly</i> , <i>sadly</i> , <i>tragically</i> | Communicated Content |
| source/hearsay | <i>allegedly</i> , <i>reportedly</i> | Communicated Content |
| epistemic modality (subjective) | <i>certainly</i> , <i>probably</i> , <i>possibly</i> | Propositional Content |
| volitive/boulomaic modality | <i>hopefully</i> | Propositional Content |
| evidentiality (inference) | <i>apparently</i> , <i>obviously</i> , <i>evidently</i> | Propositional Content |
| epistemic modality (objective) | <i>maybe</i> , <i>perhaps</i> | Episode |
| evidentiality (deduction) | <i>apparently</i> , <i>obviously</i> , <i>evidently</i> | Episode |
| evaluation ("subject-oriented" adverbs) | <i>cleverly</i> , <i>wisely</i> , <i>stupidly</i> , <i>wickedly</i> | Propositional Content, Episode, Configurational Property, Lexical Property |

argued in Keizer (2019) are clearly representational but are flexible in the sense that they may scope over all representational layers (see also Cinque, 1999; Ernst, 2002; Mittwoch et al., 2002; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008; Haumann, 2007, p. 411; Dik et al., 1990; Ramat and Ricca, 1998).

Note that the classification presented here does not only capture the differences in scope between the various groups of stance adverbs, but also reflects different degrees of subjectivity (cf. Lyons, 1982, p. 105; Traugott, 2010, p. 32), with adverbs modifying the higher layers being more subjective than those modifying lower layers. In addition, it will be clear that more subclasses of stance adverbs can (and have) been distinguished (e.g. Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 191); however, due to the form-oriented approach of FDG, only those functional distinctions are represented that are systematically reflected in form. Finally, as is well known, one and the same adverb can function at different layers, as a result of processes of (inter)subjectification;¹⁰ unfortunately, a diachronic analysis of these adverbs is beyond the scope of this paper.¹¹

4.3. Truth-conditionality

Speech Act theoreticians were among the first to observe that certain adverbs do not contribute to the proposition expressed in an utterance (are not truth-conditional), but instead function to indicate the speaker's attitude towards the speech act or the proposition it contains (e.g. Urmson, 1963; Strawson, 1973; Allerton and Cruttenden, 1974, p. 7-8; Bach and Harnish, 1979; Chafe, 1986; Palmer, 1986; Fraser, 1996); examples of such non-truth-conditional adverbs were illocutionary adverbs (e.g. *frankly*, *confidentially*, *honestly*), attitudinal adverbs (e.g. *unfortunately*, *sadly*, *luckily*), as well as evidential (e.g. *evidently*, *obviously*) and hearsay adverbs (e.g. *allegedly*, *reportedly*). Although intuitively these adverbs are indeed different from propositional adverbs, finding a way of testing truth-conditionality has proven to be far from easy. In what follows, two diagnostics that are frequently applied, the assent/dissent and the scope diagnostic (see also Papafragou, 2006), are applied to different sets of adverbs.

4.3.1. The assent/dissent diagnostic

This test is based on the fact that truth-conditional adverbs, as part of the propositional content of an utterance, can be (directly) affirmed or denied, whereas non-truth-conditional adverbs cannot. In Functional Discourse Grammar, this test has thus been used to support the distinction between interpersonal and representational modifiers (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 128-129). Consider examples (5) and (6):

- (5) And I *frankly* failed. (COCA, newspaper)
 a. I agree. (You did.); No (You didn't.)
 b. *I agree. (You are being frank.); No (You are not being frank.)¹²
- (6) he had *frankly* admitted that he didn't know (COCA, fiction)
 a. I agree. (He didn't know.)
 b. I agree. (He was being frank.)

In (5) the Propositional Content as a whole can be affirmed or denied (see (5a)), but the information conveyed by the illocutionary adverb *frankly* cannot (see (5b)); illocutionary *frankly* is thus non-truth-conditional. The same holds for other interpersonal adverbs, like discourse-organizational or attitudinal adverbs. In (6), where *frankly* is used as a manner adverb, it is possible to deny the contribution made by the adverb (6b)). Thus, manner adverbs, as well as other lower-level adverbs (e.g. domain and aspect adverbs) are truth-conditional.

Let us now turn to adverbs modifying the proposition itself, such as the epistemic adverbs *possibly*, *probably* and *certainly*. These adverbs are typically assumed to be truth-conditional, since their function is to indicate the degree of commitment of the speaker to the proposition expressed; adding or omitting these adverbs therefore affects the truth-value of the proposition (e.g. Bellert, 1977, pp. 243-344; Ifantidou, 1993; Ramat and Ricca, 1998, p. 189). As shown in (7), this is indeed confirmed by the assent/dissent test:

- (7) The free fall in the economy has *probably* stopped. (COCA, newspaper)
 a. I don't agree (it hasn't stopped)
 b. I don't agree (it has certainly stopped)

¹⁰ Note, for instance, that the epistemic adverbs *apparently*, *obviously* and *evidently* appear twice in Table 1: as expressions of inferential modality and as expressions of deductive modality. For a detailed discussion of the various functions and scopes of English evidential adverbs, see Kemp (2018).

¹¹ As illustrated elsewhere, the model also makes it possible to chart the processes of subjectification and intersubjectification, by tracing the movement of an element through the model, from the Representational Level to the Interpersonal Level, and, within each level, from lower layers to higher layers (see e.g. Hengeveld, 2011; Dall'Aglio Hatther and Hengeveld, 2016; Giomi, 2017; Olbertz and Honselaar, 2017).

¹² Note, however, that "indirect" negation is possible, as shown in the following example (from Ifantidou, 1993, p. 84):

- (i) Peter: *Frankly*, this party is boring.
 Mary: You're not being frank. I've just seen you dancing with the blond beauty in blue.

Although non-truth-conditional, these adverbs are still lexical (in FDG) or conceptual (in Relevance Theory); as such the content (or applicability) of the adverb itself can still be evaluated (affirmed, denied or questioned) (cf. Rouchota's (1998, p. 115) distinction between truth-conditional and truth-evaluable; see also Asher (2000: 33).

Thus, unlike discourse-organizational, illocutionary or attitudinal adverbs, epistemic and evidential adverbs are truth-conditional. This fits in well with the fact that they are analysed at the Representational Level, where they modify the layer of the Propositional Content.

Finally, when we apply the test to evaluative adverbs like *cleverly* and *foolishly*, it turns out these adverbs behave like interpersonal adverbs, in that they cannot be confirmed or denied:

- (8) Peter *cleverly* avoided the question.
 a. I don't agree. (He didn't avoid the question).
 b. *I don't agree. (It wasn't a clever thing to do).

In other words, these adverbs are non-truth-conditional, despite the fact that they have consistently been analysed as scoping over a low, representational level of analysis (either the proposition (e.g. Haumann, 2007, p. 411; Dik et al., 1990; Ramat and Ricca, 1998) or the state-of-affairs (e.g. Cinque, 1999; Ernst, 2002; Mittwoch et al., 2002; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008); we will return to this apparent contradiction below (Section 5.2).

4.3.2. The scope diagnostic

The scope (or 'embedding') test (e.g. Ifantidou, 1993; Asher, 2000; Papafragou, 2006; see also Cohen, 1971; Wilson, 1975) consists in embedding the sentence containing the adverb into a conditional to see if the adverb falls within the scope of *if*; if it does, the adverb is truth-conditional; if not, it is non-truth-conditional. Ifantidou (1993) argues that application of this test confirms that illocutionary and attitudinal adverbs are indeed non-truth-conditional. She provides example (9a) to show this for the attitudinal adverb *unfortunately* (Ifantidou, 1993, pp. 74-75).

- (9) a. Mary has *unfortunately* missed the deadline.
 b. ??If Mary has *unfortunately* missed the deadline, she can reapply in May.

After embedding the adverb into a conditional (example (9b)), the question to be answered is under which conditions Mary can reapply in May: (10a) or (10b)? Since the answer is (10a), we can conclude that the attitudinal adverb *unfortunately* is not truth-conditional.

- (10) a. Mary missed the deadline.
 b. It is unfortunate that Mary missed the deadline.

However, despite the fact that the outcome is as expected, the test is problematic since the sentence in (9b), with the adverb *unfortunately* embedded in the *if*-clause, is distinctly odd (cf. Ifantidou, 1993, p. 75). The same is true for illocutionary *frankly*:

- (11) a. John's book has *frankly* sold very little.
 b. ??If John's book has *frankly* sold very little, they will not renew his contract.

If, however, *frankly* is used as a manner adverb, the test can be applied without problems, as shown in (12). In this case the adverb does contribute to the truth-value of the proposition in the main clause (the proposition expressed in the main clause in (12b) is true when John speaks to them and does so *frankly*); therefore, manner *frankly* is truth-conditional.

- (12) a. John spoke to them *frankly*.
 b. If John speaks to them *frankly*, they will be willing to listen.

The weakness of this test lies in the fact that it requires embedding of an adverb in an *if*-clause. *If*-clauses, however, do not contain a proposition (they do not assert, and as such cannot be affirmed or denied). As such they can only include adverbs belonging to layers below the proposition (e.g. aspect or manner adverbs). Embedding an attitudinal or illocutionary adverb inevitably leads to questionable results. For the same reason, the test is difficult to apply to subjective epistemic adverbs like *probably* or evidential adverbs like *obviously*.¹³ However, the very fact that embedding these adverbs in the *if*-clause leads to a questionable result may be taken as an indication that these adverbs belong either to the layer of the Propositional Content or to a higher layer.

¹³ Note that objective modal adjectives (*it is possible that*) or modal verbs (*may, must*), which, in FDG, are analysed as belonging to layers below that of the Propositional Contents (e.g. Dall'Aglio Hattner and Hengeveld, 2016, p. 10; cf. Lyons, 1977, pp. 805–806; Hengeveld, 1988; Dik, 1997, pp. 242-243; Nuyts, 1992, 2001; Dall'Aglio Hattner and Hella Olbertz, 2018), can be embedded in an *if*-clause (and can thus be shown to be truth-conditional).

Particularly interesting in this respect are the evaluative adverbs (see Keizer, 2019). As shown in example (13a), embedding an adverb like *stupidly* in an *if*-clause is unproblematic, suggesting that they must scope over a low level of analysis (below the layer of the Propositional Content). The outcome of the test itself, however, shows, once again, that these adverbs are non-truth-conditional: in (13b) the conditions under which we must ask someone else to give the plenary are not affected by the presence of the adverb *stupidly* (whether or not it was a stupid thing for Mary to decide not to give the plenary is in this respect irrelevant).

- (13) a. Mary has *stupidly* decided not to give the plenary.
b. If Mary has *stupidly* decided not to give the plenary, we must ask someone else.

What we can conclude from the application of the two diagnostics for truth-conditionality is that, although most stance adverbs are non-truth-conditional, this is not a necessary feature of stance adverbs. This means that in FDG stance adverbs can occur at both the Interpersonal and the Representational Level: those that are non-truth-conditional and necessarily speaker-bound, like illocutionary *frankly* and attitudinal *unfortunately*, are analysed at the Interpersonal Level, while others (those that are truth-conditional and not necessarily speaker-bound, such as epistemic and evidential adverbs) are represented at the Representational level. An interesting group in this respect are evaluative adverbs like *cleverly* and *stupidly*, which seem to combine non-truth-conditionality with a representational status.

4.4. Syntactic properties

If we now turn to the syntactic properties of stance adverbs, it is first of all important to realize that the syntactic features relevant for the classification of (stance) adverbs fall into three groups. First there is the group of features that are typically used in the literature to show that an adverb is syntactically non-integrated (parenthetical); these features include the possibility of clefting and questioning of an adverb, and the question of whether it falls within the scope of proforms/ellipsis/negation. Here it will be argued that although these features are indeed shared by all stance adverbs (are necessary features), they are not by themselves enough to distinguish a class of stance adverbs (are not sufficient features). Other features, such as clausal position and embedding, provide us with more information about the exact layer of analysis of an adverb; once again, however, these features fail to define a set of stance adverbs as distinguished from other, less subjective, adverbs. The same is true for the third set of features (e.g. modification, coordination), which may help to distinguish between interpersonal and representational adverbs, but which do not define the class of stance adverbs.

4.4.1. Clefting, questioning and scope of proforms/ellipsis/negation

As several linguists have pointed out, adverbs differ with regard to the possibility of clefting and questioning, as well as with regard to whether they fall within the scope of pronominalization, ellipsis or negation. This has often been used as a means to distinguish so-called parenthetical adverbs from sentence adverbs (e.g. Quirk et al., 1985, pp. 504-505, 612-631; Espinal, 1991, p. 729; Contreras, 1976; Haegeman, 2009 [1991]). Here I will argue that these properties do not so much follow from the parenthetical status of the adverb in question, but instead reflect the non-predicational, and as such more subjective, status of an adverb.

Starting with the criterion of clefting, we find a clear contrast between the attitudinal adverb *fortunately* in (14), which does not allow for clefting, and manner adverbs like *lightly* in (15), which do:

- (14) a. They *fortunately* had just finished a staff meeting and treatment could begin immediately (COCA, magazine)
b. *It was *fortunately* that they had just finished a staff meeting...
(15) So it was *lightly* that my husband eased me away from home and church, (COCA, fiction)

As it turns out, however, many otherwise syntactically integrated, non-parenthetical adverbs (e.g. modal and evidential adverbs) also resist clefting, as demonstrated in example (16) (see also Allerton and Cruttenden, 1974, p. 4; Quirk et al., 1985, p. 504).

- (16) It was **probably/*obviously/*inevitably* that John took the money.

The same is true for the questioning test. Example (17) shows that attitudinal *fortunately* cannot be elicited by questions (Bellert, 1977; Quirk et al., 1985, pp. 504-505; Espinal, 1991, p. 729; Haegeman, 2009 [1991], p. 332), whereas, strictly speaking, elicitation of manner adverbs is possible (example (18)).

- (17) They *fortunately* had just finished a staff meeting ... (COCA, magazine)
A: ???
B: **Fortunately*.
(18) So it was *lightly* that my husband eased me away from home and church, (COCA, fiction)
A: How did your husband ease you away from home and church?
B: *Lightly*.

The reason that clefting and questioning are not possible with certain groups of adverbs is that these processes seem to be restricted to elements within the predication (the State-of-Affairs), in particular the *who*, *what*, *where*, *when*, *how* and *why*. Since non-truth-conditional adverbs like *fortunately* and epistemic adverbs like *probably* are not part of the predication, they do not allow clefting and questioning (see also Keizer, 2018b, to appear). It is for the same reason that, as observed in previous accounts (Quirk et al., 1985, pp. 504-505, 612-631; Haegeman, 2009 [1991], pp. 332-334; see also Bellert, 1977, pp. 339-340), high-layer adverbs like *frankly* do not fall within the scope of (predication) proforms, ellipsis or negation, whereas low-level adverbs do.

Since stance adverbs are typically not part of the predication (at least not of the core predication), they may indeed be expected to resist clefting and questioning, and to fall outside the scope of pronominalization, ellipsis and negation. This means that in FDG, subjective adverbs are represented at layers higher than the State-of-Affairs. The distinction, is however, not a strict one, since certain predicational or lower-layer adverbs (not only evaluative adverbs like *cleverly*, but also lower-layer modal adverbs such as *necessarily* and *inevitably*, which typically fall within the scope of negation) cannot be clefted or questioned either.

4.4.2. Clausal position and syntactic distribution

4.4.2.1. *Clausal position.* Other differences in syntactic behaviour between different groups of adverbs, however, do not follow from their (non-)predicational status, but rather from the specific layer of analysis they belong to. Two of these differences (concerning clausal position and restrictions on embedding) will be discussed in this section.

In accordance with what is recorded in the literature (e.g. Jackendoff, 1972; Cinque, 1999; Pullum and Huddleston, 2002, pp. 579-580; Laenzlinger, 2004, 2015; Ernst, 2002; Haumann, 2007), higher layer adverbs like *frankly* and *fortunately* and lower layer adverbs like manner adverbs differ in the kinds of clausal position they prefer. Thus, although both groups can, and often do, occur in medial position, higher layer adverbs have a clear preference for more leftward positions, and are virtually absent in final position; manner adverbs on the other hand, predominantly occur in post-verbal (including final) position (a corpus study in Keizer (2018b), using the COCA, showed that illocutionary *frankly* appeared in initial and post-subject position in more than half of the cases (28% and 28.8%), respectively, while manner adverb *frankly* occurred in post-verbal position in 90% of all cases).¹⁴ Some examples are given in (19), for illocutionary *frankly* and attitudinal *unfortunately*, and in (20), for the manner adverbs *frankly* and *sadly*:

- (19) a. It's not a slight error. It's *frankly* an astonishing misstatement of the law (COCA, newspaper)
 b. ... and *frankly* Mr. Keane's attitude is doing exactly nothing to allay those concerns. (COCA, fiction)
- (20) a. Rabnaara met her gaze *frankly*. (COCA, fiction)
 b. He turned to Moira and smiled *sadly* (COCA, fiction)

Similarly, in the case of evaluative *cleverly*, the large majority (98.31%) occurs, as expected, in preverbal (predominantly medial) position. When used as a manner adverb, *cleverly* also prefers preverbal position (leading to possible ambiguities out of context; see Ernst, 2002, p. 269; Mittwoch et al., 2002, p. 676), but also frequently occurs post-verbally (62.25% against 36.85%).

The differences in placement between adverbs modifying different layers is even more apparent when it comes to relative placement. Thus, illocutionary and attitudinal adverbs have a strong tendency to precede epistemic adverbs (example (21)), which in turn precede lower-layer adverbs (shown in example (22) for manner and frequency adverbs).

- (21) a. but *frankly* Anthony *probably* has a better sense of the culture, (COCA, spoken)
 b. It does exist, but it *unfortunately probably* does inspire others to go out and mistakenly try to prove something (COCA, newspaper)
- (22) a. Experts think the boat, which had three holes in it, *probably quickly* filled up with sand. (COCA, newspaper)
 b. The ancient combats were a lot bloodier and *probably often* resulted in death (COCA, academic)

When it comes to the relative ordering of epistemic and evaluative adverbs, however, there seems to be a lack of consensus. Thus, whereas Cinque (1999) and Ernst (2002), on the basis of examples like those in (23), conclude that epistemic modals scope over evaluative adverbs (e.g. Ernst, 2002, pp. 19, 105), Haumann (2007, p. 160) uses the examples in (24) to argue that evaluative adverbs have a higher base position than epistemic adverbs.

- (23) a. She *probably* has *wisely* returned the money.
 b. *She *cleverly* has *probably* returned the money.
- (24) a. *Wisely* they *probably* decided to go...
 b. *Foolishly* she *possibly* would pull her stitches.

¹⁴ Thanks are due to Sebastian Haas for collecting and coding the corpus examples for absolute and relative position.

These positional preferences are captured by the FDG way of determining linear order, which takes place in a top-down, outside in manner, i.e. starting from the highest layer at the Interpersonal level and ending with the lowest layer at the Representational Level, thus reflecting the theory's function-to-form approach. Note, however, that the fact that not only manner or frequency adverbs but also stance adverbs are restricted when it comes to clausal position may be taken as a clear indication that in this respect all these adverbs are still part of the clause, i.e. syntactically integrated (see Keizer, 2018b, to appear).

4.4.2.2. *Syntactic distribution.* As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the fact that modifiers are assigned to a particular layer of analysis allows for predictions about which adverbs can occur in which verbal complements. On the assumption that different types of verbs take different layers as their clausal complement (i.e. have different selectional or subcategorizational properties), we may expect there to be constraints on the occurrence of adverbs in the clausal complement of a verb in the sense that a complement cannot contain adverbs that function as modifiers of a higher layer than that of the complement itself (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 363–365; see also Bach, 1999, p. 358; Potts, 2005, pp. 145–146).

Given the fact that adverbs like illocutionary *frankly* and attitudinal *unfortunately* occur at high layers of analysis, the prediction is that they can occur in the complement of only very few verbs, namely only of those verbs that take a whole Discourse Act or Move as their complement, i.e. *add, conclude* or *summarize* (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 363–365). A corpus study using data from the COCA, conducted by Keizer (2018b), confirms these predictions. Thus, illocutionary *frankly* hardly ever occurs in embedded contexts,¹⁵ while the attitudinal adverb *unfortunately* occurs in the complement of the verbs *add* or *say* (see example (25)); this is as expected, since *unfortunately* functions as a modifier of the Communicated Content, and the verbs *add* and *say* take this layer (*say*) or a higher layer (*add*) as their complement. Attitudinal adverbs do not, however, occur in the complement of verbs like *know* or *believe* (which take a propositional complement);

- (25) a. Granting all that, it remains to be *added* that *unfortunately* Tocqueville had no equal among the many European conservative critics of American democracy for the fairness and justice of his criticism. (COCA, academic)
 b. I was going to *say* that *unfortunately* they have stretched the law and created a lot of case precedents, (COCA, spoken)

Epistemic adverbs like *probably*, on the other hand, do occur in the complement of verbs like *know, believe, hope, assume*, etc., as well as in the complement of higher-layer verbs (see example (26)); they do not, however, occur in complement of verbs taking a lower layer (e.g. an SoA or Configurational Property) as their complement:

- (26) a. Mallet wasn't sure what caused earthquakes. He *believed* they were *probably* the result of some sort of underground explosions (COCA, magazine)
 b. Series weaponsmaster Tommy Dunne *added* that it *probably* broke a world record (COCA, magazine)

Frequency, domain and manner adverbs, however, do occur in the complement of verbs taking a low-layer complement (such as aspectual or ability verbs):

- (27) a. After relocating to the US, Einstein *began* to publish *frequently* in North American journals. (COCA, academic)
 b. When did your daughter *begin* to get so involved *politically*? (COCA, spoken)
 c. We *continue* to work *diligently* with airport authorities to reach a long-term solution (COCA, newspaper)

Interestingly, the same is true for evaluative adverbs, suggesting that these (can) scope over very low layers of analysis (see also Keizer, 2019):

- (28) a. they *continue* to *recklessly* lump all drug-related deaths together, (NOW Corpus, CA)
 b. Harvey started having trouble gripping and feeling the baseball and *began* to *uncharacteristically* tire early in starts, (NOW Corpus, US)

From the above, it will be clear that the evidence from embedding coincides entirely with the evidence from absolute and relative position, and serves as a reliable indication of the layer of analysis an adverb belongs to. It will also be clear, however, that, here too, the different stance adverbs exhibit disparate syntactic behaviour. Moreover, it is once again the group of evaluative adverbs that behave in an unexpected manner: despite their subjective and non-truth-conditional nature, they seem to belong to a low layer of analysis. Note, finally, that the restrictions on the use of high-layer stance adverbs like illocutionary *frankly* and attitudinal *unfortunately* in the complement of verbs shows that these stance adverbs are still to some extent syntactically integrated.

4.4.3. Modification and comparison

Let us now turn to the third set of features of adverbs that can help us to determine the degree of subjectivity of an adverb, such as modification (as well as comparison) and coordination (see also De Smet and Verstraete, 2006). These features are not

¹⁵ It can be found after the phrase *I think*, but it may be (and has been) argued that *think* in these cases no longer functions as a complement-taking verb (e.g. Thompson, 2002).

(necessarily) related to (non-)truth-conditionality of the adverb in question; nor do they provide us with specific information about the layer of analysis. They can, however, be used as indicators of interpersonal or representational status. For reasons of space, in what follows only modification and comparison will be discussed.

One indication of both the subjective status of a subclass of adverbs is the types of modification they accept. As pointed out in Keizer (2018b), as an illocutionary adverb *frankly* only allows a narrow range of modifiers, such as *quite* and *very*:

- (29) a. We know very little about what works and *quite frankly* they do not want to be treated. (COCA, spoken)
 b. And what people are asking now is that the military become some sort of social science laboratory, and *very frankly* our first and foremost job is not to advance social causes, however meritorious they may be. (COCA, newspaper)

As a manner adverb, on the other hand, *frankly*, can also be modified by degree modifiers like *so*, *too*, *equally* and *how* (examples 30a-c); as shown in (30d), it can also occur in *as*-comparatives:

- (30) a. No woman had ever spoken *so frankly* to him in his life. (COCA, fiction)
 b. You think I speak *too frankly*. (COCA, fiction)
 c. "Did you like Helen Etheridge, Mr. Hamilton?" Pitt asked it so candidly that it was robbed of implication. "Yes," Hamilton said *equally frankly*. (COCA, fiction)
 d. But a couple of brave souls told Bush *as frankly* as they dared that he was getting bad advice from his economists. (COCA, magazine)

Epistemic and evidential adverbs seem to fall somewhere in between these two groups: they can be modified by the interpersonal modifiers *quite*, *very* and *just*, as well as by the representational modifier *equally*, but not by *so*, *too* or *how*:¹⁶

- (31) a. Straight ahead in the distance was a. replace (sic) vast enough to roast more than one proverbial ox... or *equally possibly* a couple of recalcitrant peasants (COCA, fiction)
 b. *Equally obviously*, the estimates of drug money flows are very crude (COCA, academic)

Evaluative adverbs, on the other hand, seem to allow for the same range of modifiers as manner adverbs, including degree modifiers like *so*, *too* and *almost*. Some examples are given in (32):

- (32) a. he'd found the still and silent epicenter of all that fatal action he had *so wisely* avoided. (COCA, fiction)
 b. They *too recklessly* reduce the myriad complexities of the Christian world into a bogus behemoth, (<https://www.hoover.org/research/can-iran-become-democracy>)
 c. "They have *almost recklessly* continued to proceed on a path that is going nowhere," Dr Ferguson said. (NOW Corpus, JM)

Overall, the syntactic evidence provided in this section shows that, although subjective adverbs behave in many ways differently from other, less subjective adverbs, they do not exhibit consistent syntactic behaviour. What they all have in common is that, as expected, they cannot be clefted or questioned, and they are all outside the scope of (predication) pronominalization, ellipsis and negation; as argued in section 4.4.1, however, this is not enough to distinguish them from (certain) more objective, lower-layer adverbs. As for clausal position, it is clear that the most subjective adverbs do indeed tend to occur in more peripheral positions, reflecting their larger scope; the evidence from embedding confirms these findings (Section 4.4.2). Note, however, that in both cases, evaluative adverbs behave quite differently from the other classes of stance adverbs, supporting the idea that, despite their non-truth-conditionality, these adverbs modify low layers of analysis. Similar patterns can be found when it comes to modification (Section 4.4.3): whereas on the whole subjective adverbs behave differently from more objective adverbs, this does not seem to be the case for evaluative modifiers, which allow for the same range of modifiers as the corresponding manner adverbs.

4.5. Prosodic (non-)integration

So far, the discussion of subjective (and other) adverbs has been restricted to their prosodically integrated use, i.e. to those cases where the adverb is part of a larger prosodic unit. In many cases, however, adverbs (in particular, but not necessarily, subjective ones) are not prosodically integrated, but are realized as separate intonational phrases (i.e. as supplements, with their own intonational contour, and set off from surrounding material by intonational boundaries; cf. Pullum and Huddleston, 2002, pp. 575–577; Potts, 2005). By doing so, the speaker draws more attention to (places stronger emphasis on) the adverb in question, thus creating a stronger communicative effect. This is particularly clear in those cases where the adverb in question forms a separate move:

¹⁶ Note that *obviously* can be preceded by *so*, *too* or *how*; in that case, however, it functions either as manner or as an objective evidential (deductive) adverb:

(ia) She hadn't realized just *how obviously* a bodyguard's stance told an attacker exactly where the victim was. (COCA, fiction) [manner]
 (ib) He smiled up at Jack, hoping *too obviously* to be liked. (COCA, fiction) [deductive]

- (33) a. A: You have to train someone to do that?
 B: *Unfortunately*. (COCA, spoken)
 b. A: would it be a vegetarian meal?
 B: *Probably. Probably*. (COCA, spoken)

The stronger communicative effect is, however, also present in those cases where an adverb is linearly interpolated in a larger unit, as in examples (34) to (36), due to the fact that these adverbs have their own illocution. In most cases, prosodically non-integrated adverbs function as declaratives (as in example (34)), but they can also take the form of interrogatives (example (35)), or (especially in the case of manner adverbs) imperatives (example (36)).

- (34) a. Let me put it in context, then, because I was in that room. And it was, *frankly*, verbal rape. (COCA, spoken)
 b. That doesn't surprise me, *frankly*. (COCA, spoken)
 (35) a. As someone who ACTUALLY WORKS IN FILM, I'm going to tell you now that here is plenty of desire south there. A director sometimes works much less hard than all [t]he rest of the crew. I've worked with award winning male AND female directors, and *frankly*? The women actually work harder. (NOW Corpus)
 b. and that that would take some research and *frankly* [laughter] not by me (LCD Fisher Corpus, 2005-fe_03_03674, 350.47–356.13)¹⁷
 (36) "Oh, my lady, put it back. *Quickly!*" (COCA, fiction)

The stronger communicative effect may also be related to the specific discourse-pragmatic function of an adverb. Thus, as argued elsewhere (Keizer, 2018b), the adverb *frankly* can perform at least four different functions, with different degrees of illocutionary force. These are (in order of increasing force): honesty, concession (cf. Fraser, 1996), persuasion and appeal. A study of the use of *frankly* in American English (using COCA and the LDC Fisher Corpus (Cieri et al., 2004)) shows that the extra communicative weight associated with the prosodically non-integrated realization results in a shift away from the basic function of expressing honesty towards the stronger discourse-pragmatic functions of strong persuasion and appeal. Since the relation between the prosodic (non-)integration of illocutionary *frankly* and its specific discourse-pragmatic function is not (yet) entirely systematic, and interpretation relies largely on the context, we are dealing with pragmatic rather than semantic subjectivity; moreover, it may be claimed that, given the interactive, addressee-oriented nature of the functions persuasion and appeal, we are dealing with cases of (pragmatic) intersubjectification.

In addition, it turns out that prosodic independence also affects the degree of syntactic integration of an adverb: when an adverb takes the form of a separate intonational phrase, it becomes entirely syntactically non-integrated. Example (37), for instance, shows that restrictions on clausal position are lifted when the adverb is prosodically non-integrated; as a result, the adverbs can, for instance, occur in post-verbal, including final, position; as shown in (38) higher-layer adverbs can now also precede lower-layer adverbs:

- (37) a. That being said, this is another example, *unfortunately*, of the president stepping on his own good news day (COCA, spoken)
 b. That doesn't surprise me, *frankly*. (COCA, spoken)
 (38) a. It's probably, *frankly*, a legacy of the immigration bill that passed under Ronald Reagan (COCA, spoken)
 b. the traditions of our great intellectual heritage, which far too often, *unfortunately*, have been lost. (COCA, spoken)
 c. Trances sometimes, *unfortunately*, segue into naps. (COCA, fiction)

Similarly, as demonstrated in (39), high layer adverbs can now interrupt low-level verbal complements:

- (39) a. The difficulty is in trusting in a system that has continued to produce, *frankly*, no results, (NOW, Daily Mail, GB)
 b. then you start getting, *unfortunately*, a fairly complicated message, and it's harder to get across. (COCA, spoken)
 c. Everybody knows that this unity government, *unfortunately*, so far is something of a – more of a make-believe government. (COCA, spoken)
 d. Walter explained that he must, *unfortunately*, beg to be released at ten o'clock as he had to return to Freston. (COCA, fiction)

What the preceding discussion tells us is that, although there may be a relation between the prosodic (non-)integration of an adverb and its degree of subjectivity, prosodic integration cannot be regarded as systematically coding any particular subclass of adverb (subjective, parenthetical or otherwise). Prosodic non-integration does, however, affect the degree of syntactic non-integration of an adverb. As argued below, these features can be accounted for by analysing prosodically independent adverbs (of any kind) not as modifiers of a layer within a larger Discourse Act (as in the case of prosodically integrated adverbs), but as separate Discourse Acts (see Section 5.3).

5. Capturing the heterogeneity of stance adverbs in FDG

In what follows it will be demonstrated how the theory of Functional Discourse Grammar can be used to capture the heterogeneity of stance adverbs described in this paper, while at the same time bringing out what they have in common. For this, use will be made of three major distinctions:

¹⁷ This example is from the LCD Fisher Corpus of spoken American English (see Cieri et al., 2004); the adverb *frankly* has a rising tone.

1. The distinction between interpersonal and representational modifiers (Section 5.1);
2. At the Representational Level, the distinction between adverbs used as modifiers within a Propositional Content, and adverbs used as separate, additional Propositional Contents (Section 5.2);
3. The distinction between (interpersonal or representational) adverbs used as modifiers of a particular layer of analysis within a Nuclear Discourse Act and those used as separate, Subsidiary Discourse Acts (Section 5.3).

5.1. The distinction between interpersonal and representational modifiers

As we have seen, prosodically integrated stance adverbs are analysed in FDG as modifying a particular layer of analysis. One basic distinction in the theory is that between interpersonal and representational stance adverbs. Interpersonal stance adverbs, such as illocutionary *frankly*, attitudinal (*un*)*fortunately*, discourse-organizational *finally*, etc. are speaker-bound and non-truth-conditional (see Section 4.3). Their exact layer of analysis is determined by their scope (illocutionary adverbs scope over the Illocution, attitudinal adverbs over the Communicated Contents, etc.; see Section 4.2, Table 1); these differences in scope result in differences in syntactic behaviour, in terms of preferred clausal position and (non-)occurrence in the complements of specific types of verbs (Section 4.4.2). Finally, due to their semantically bleached nature, modification of these adverbs is highly restricted to elements that are themselves interpersonal, in particular reinforcing and mitigating adverbs like *quite* and *very* (Section 4.4.3).

Representational modifiers, including epistemic and evidential adverbs, on the other hand, are truth-conditional, and need not be speaker-bound. These adverbs function as modifiers at a particular representational layer (e.g. subjective epistemic and inferential evidential adverbs at the layer of the Propositional Content). These adverbs allow for various kinds of representational modification, while their preferred clausal position, as well as their occurrence in the complements of certain verbs, clearly show that these adverbs do indeed belong to a layer at the Representational Level.

The differences in scope between these adverbs is captured in FDG by assigning these adverbs to a particular layer of analysis; this was already illustrated in examples (1) and (2) above, repeated here for convenience:

- (1) a. my parents *unsurprisingly* did not accept my argument. (COCA, fiction)
b. (M_i: (A_i: [(F_i: DECL (F_i)) (P_i)_S (P_j)_A (C_i: [...] (C_i): unsurprisingly (C_i))] (A_i)) (M_i))
- (2) a. his opinions *probably* do not reflect the law. (BYU-BNC, academic)
b. (p_i: (pres ep_i: (neg e_i: (f_i: [...] (f_i)) (e_i)) (ep_i)) (p_i): probable (p_i))

5.2. Adverbs as separate Propositional Contents at the representational level

Throughout this paper, it has become clear that evaluative adverbs are different from other subjective adverbs, in the sense that they are non-truth-conditional (suggesting an analysis at the Interpersonal Level) while at the same time scoping over a low layer of analysis (suggesting an analysis at the Representational Level). In addition, it has been shown that the syntactic tests fail to provide unequivocal evidence as to the exact layer of analysis, with evidence from clausal position suggesting anything up to the Propositional Content, whereas the embedding test suggests a much lower layer (Configurational Property; see example (32)). In order to make sense of this conflicting evidence, Keizer (2019) proposes that evaluative adverbs like *cleverly* and *foolishly* be analysed at the Representational Level, but as separate Propositional Contents. Thus, at the Representational Level, a sentence like (40a) would be analysed as in (40b):

- (40) a. Having *wisely* said their good-byes in the wagon, she and Sister Ida exchanged a chaste kiss, though tears were pouring down the nun's cheek. (COCA, fiction)
b. (p_i: (ep_i: (ant e_i: (f_i: [- say their goodbyes -] (f_i)) (e_i): (l_i: - in the wagon - (l_i)) (e_i)) (ep_i)) (p_i))
(p_j: (f_j: [f_k: wise (f_k) (e_i)_U] (f_j)) (p_j))_{Add}¹⁸

In (40b), we have two Propositional Contents, p_i and p_j (corresponding to a single Communicative Content at the Interpersonal Level). The second Propositional Content (p_j) consists of a Configurational Property (f_j) in which the Property 'wise' (f_k) functions as a non-verbal predicate taking the SoA (e_i) contained in the first Propositional Content as its argument (indicated by co-indexation). The fact that the adverb *wisely* has scope over the place adverb *in the wagon* (l_i) shows that the argument of the non-verbal predicate must (at least) take the form of an SoA (cf. Cinque, 1999; Ernst, 2002; Mittwoch et al., 2002; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008). The second Propositional Content cannot be used independently; it merely provides additional information about the unit in question (namely that saying their goodbyes in the wagon was a wise thing to do); therefore, it is analysed as a dependent Propositional Content with the semantic function Addition.

As shown in Section 4.3, however, there is evidence (from linear position and distribution) to suggest that these evaluative adverbs may also scope over higher representational layers, such as the Propositional Contents (in keeping with other

¹⁸ The operator 'ant' stands for anterior (triggering the auxiliary *have*). The argument of a non-verbal predicate is assigned the semantic function Undergoer, since the argument undergoes a process of predication (more particularly classification, similar to classifying copular constructions; Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, p. 204).

accounts of these adverbs, e.g. [Dik et al., 1990](#); [Ramat and Ricca, 1998](#); [Haumann, 2007, p. 160](#)), as well as over the lower layer of the Configurational Property. It will be clear that this behaviour can easily be accounted for in the analysis proposed here, by assuming that the argument of a non-verbal predicate can also take the form of any representational layer. In addition, this analysis can explain the unexpected non-truth-conditionality of these adverbs: since they function as separate Propositional Contents, they do not affect the truth-conditions of the main Propositional Content. Like other representational modifiers, however, they do allow for all kinds of (representational) modifiers and follow interpersonal adverbs.

5.3. Adverbs as separate Discourse Acts

Finally, Functional Discourse Grammar also offers an elegant way of distinguishing between prosodically integrated and prosodically non-integrated (stance) adverbs. Where the former, as explained in Section 5.1, modify an interpersonal or representational layer within a Discourse Act, the latter are analysed as separate (Subsidiary) Discourse Acts. As shown in Section 4.5, prosodically non-integrated adverbs do, indeed, exhibit the typical properties of Discourse Acts. Thus, like all Discourse Acts, these adverbs typically form their own Intonational Phrase (as evidenced in spoken language by the presence of a complete intonational contour and prosodic boundary markers preceding and following the unit in question, and in written language by the presence of punctuation marks). In addition, they all have their own Illocution (determining their particular prosodic realization). Moreover, as shown in example (33), they can form a Move by themselves, or combine with other Discourse Acts to make up a Move (examples (34)–(36)). In the latter case, there is a relation of dependence between the two Discourse Acts, with the Discourse Act corresponding to the clause (the host) functioning as the Nuclear Discourse Act (i.e. the communicatively more important Discourse Act), and the Discourse Act consisting of the adverb serving as a Subsidiary Discourse Act. To express the specific dependency relation between the Nuclear and the Subsidiary Discourse Act, the latter is provided with a rhetorical function ([Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008, pp. 52–58](#); [Keizer, 2018b, p. 82](#)) determining the linear position of the adverbs: the function *Prelude* for adverbs preceding, the function *Aside* for adverbs interrupting, and the function *Afterthought* for adverbs following the Nuclear Discourse Act. A (simplified) representation of the adverb *cleverly* used as an Afterthought is given in the following example:

- (41) a. “You’re lying,” I say, *cleverly*. (COCA, fiction) (= example (29b))
- b. (M_i: [(A_i) (A_j)_{Afterthought}] (M_i))

In all these ways, adverbs functioning as separate Discourse Acts clearly differ from those functioning as modifiers within a single Discourse Act. Moreover, it is only when adverbs function as separate Discourse Acts that they become syntactically fully non-integrated, as shown by the fact that they are no longer (syntactically) restricted in terms of linear placement and distribution (Section 4.5).




Fig. 2. A (partial) taxonomy of stance adverbs in Functional Discourse Grammar.

5.4. Stance adverbs in Functional Discourse Grammar: an overview

An overview of the different groups of stance adverbs and their analysis in FDG is given in Fig. 2. Note that this figure presents just one way in which the distinctions made in this paper can be represented. Here, the first distinction is that between stance adverbs that are realized as part of a larger Discourse Act, in which case their default realization is that of a prosodically integrated element, and adverbs that function as separate (Subsidiary) Discourse Acts, in which case they are typically realized as independent prosodic units (Section 5.3).¹⁹ In the latter case, the adverbs in question are also syntactically fully non-integrated, whereas in the former case adverbs are (fully or partially) syntactically integrated. Next, a distinction is made between interpersonal and representational adverbs (Section 5.1). Interpersonal adverbs modify the various layers at the Interpersonal Level (Discourse Act, Illocution, Communicated Content); these are by definition non-truth-conditional and exhibit a degree of syntactic non-integration. Representational adverbs are typically truth-conditional and syntactically fully integrated, as in the case of epistemic and evidential adverbs, which are analysed as modifiers of the Propositional Content. There is, however, one set of representational stance adverbs that are non-truth-conditional; these are analysed as separate Propositional Contents, which may provide additional information about any representational layer (Section 5.2).

6. Conclusion

In this paper an attempt has been made to come to terms (partly at least) with the heterogeneity exhibited by stance expressions in general and stance adverbs in particular. It has been argued that the seemingly well-defined group of subjective adverbs ending in *-ly* is not, in fact, characterized by one or more shared functional or formal features. In terms of function, these adverbs perform different discourse-pragmatic and semantic functions; i.e. they differ in their object of stance. This is captured in FDG in terms of (interpersonal or representational) scope; adverbs are allocated to different layers of analysis. Since these layers are hierarchically organized, such analysis also reflects differences in degree of subjectivity – the higher the layer of analysis, the more subjective the adverb. When it comes to truth-conditionality, stance adverbs also exhibit variable behaviour: most stance adverbs are non-truth-conditional, but not all. As for their syntactic behaviour, all the subclasses of stance adverbs discussed in this paper have in common that they cannot be clefted or questioned, and that they fall outside the scope of (predication) pronominalization, ellipsis and negation – a feature that is shared, however, by other, less subjective (non-predicational) adverbs. When it comes to such properties as (absolute or relative) clausal position and syntactic distribution (occurrence in the complement of different types of verbs), the different subclasses clearly differ from one another. Finally, it has been shown that all adverbs can be used as separate intonational units; although this is more common in the case of stance adverbs, this cannot be taken as a defining feature.

Instead, it has been argued that it may be more helpful to regard the group of stance adverbs as consisting of (relatively) homogeneous subsets, defined by a number of distinctive features, some of which they share with other sets. In addition, it has been argued that such an approach would benefit from the use of an overall theory in which all the relevant distinctions find their natural place. In this paper, it has been shown that Functional Discourse Grammar, with its speaker-oriented, top-down, form-oriented function-to-form orientation, and its distinction of several levels and layers of analysis, is well-suited for this purpose. Not only does the theory provide the criteria required for determining the specific layer of analysis of each subset of adverbs, but, in addition, the architecture of the model allows for a principled way of dealing with the important distinctions discussed in Section 2.1. Thus, due to the form-oriented nature of the model, only elements with semantic subjectivity will be included in the grammar, whereas pragmatic subjectivity is regarded as arising from the interaction between the grammar and the Contextual Component. The distinction between an Interpersonal and a Representational Level – for which there is ample evidence – makes it possible to distinguish between interpersonal and ideational subjectivity. Furthermore, it has been shown that in some cases (e.g. the adverb *frankly*) intersubjective uses may have arisen; however, as long as these are not systematically coded, they are not represented in the grammar. All in all, it may therefore be concluded that the approach advocated in this paper not only allows for a systematic and insightful analysis of the different subclasses of stance (and other) adverbs, but also contributes to a further understanding of the overall notion of linguistic stance.

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¹⁹ Within these Subsidiary Discourse Acts, these adverbs are again analysed as modifiers of a particular interpersonal or representational layer. As this is not relevant to the discussion here, this is not represented in Fig. 2.

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