Toward a Model of the Interaction of Centering with Global Discourse Structure

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Abstract

Centering was formulated as a model of the relationship between attentional state, the form of referring expressions, and the coherence of an utterance *within a discourse segment*. In this paper, I argue that the restriction of centering to operating within a discourse segment should be abandoned in order to integrate centering with a model of global discourse structure. The within-segment restriction causes three problems. The first problem is that centers are often continued over discourse segment boundaries with pronominal referring expressions whose form is identical to those that occur within a discourse segment. The second problem is that recent work has shown that listeners perceive segment boundaries at various levels of granularity. If centering models human discourse processing, it is implausible that each listener is using a different centering algorithm. The third issue is that even for utterances within a discourse segment, there are strong contrasts between utterances whose adjacent utterance within a segment is hierarchically recent and those whose adjacent utterance within a segment is linearly recent. This paper argues that these problems can be eliminated by replacing Grosz and Sidner's stack model of attentional state with an alternate model, the cache model. I show how the cache model is easily integrated with the centering algorithm, and provide evidence from naturally occurring discourses that support the proposed integrated model.

1 Introduction

Centering is formulated as *a theory that relates focus of attention, choice of referring expression, and perceived coherence of utterances, within a discourse segment* [Grosz *et al.*, 1995], p. 204. In this paper, I argue that the restriction of centering to utterances within the same discourse segment poses

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three problems for the theory that can be eliminated by abandoning this restriction, and integrating centering with the cache model of attentional state [Walker, 1996].

The first problem is that centers are often continued over discourse segment boundaries with pronominal referring expressions whose form is identical to those that occur within a discourse segment. For example, consider discourse A, a naturally occurring discourse excerpt from the *Pear Stories* [Chafe, 1980; Passonneau, 1995]:

(A)   (29) and he$_i$'s going to take a pear or two, and then.. go on his way
       (30) um but *the little boy$_i$* comes,
       (31) and uh he$_i$ doesn't want just a pear,
       (32) *he$_i$* wants a whole basket.
       (33) So *he$_i$* puts the bicycle down,
       (34) and he$_i$ ...

In an experiment where naive subjects coded discourses for segment structure [Passonneau, 1995], a majority of subjects placed a discourse segment boundary between utterances (32) and (33). If utterances (32) and (33) were subjected to a centering analysis (cf. [Walker *et al.*, 1998], (33) realizes a CONTINUE transition, indicating that utterance (33) is highly coherent in the context of utterance (32). It seems implausible that a different process than centering would be required to explain the relationship between utterances (32) and (33), simply because these utterances span a discourse segment boundary.

The second problem is that listeners perceive segment boundaries at various levels of granularity [Passonneau and Litman, 1993; Hearst, 1994; Flammia and Zue, 1995; Hirschberg and Nakatani, 1996], and some segment boundaries are 'fuzzy' [Passonneau and Litman, 1996]. For example in discourse A above, 5 out of 7 subjects placed a segment boundary between utterances 29 and 30, while 4 out of 7 subjects placed a segment boundary between utterances 32 and 33 [Passonneau, 1995]. If centering models discourse processing, it is implausible that the subjects that place a segment boundary in these locations **don't** use centering to process the referring expressions in the discourse, while the subjects who didn't place a segment boundary **do** use centering for discourse processing.

The third issue is that even for utterances within a discourse segment, there are strong contrasts between utterances whose adjacent utterance within a segment is hierarchically recent and those whose adjacent utterance within a segment is linearly recent. Briefly, an utterance U_i is linearly recent for a subsequent utterance U_{i+j} if U_i occurred within the last few utterances. An utterance U_i is hierarchically recent for a subsequent utterance U_{i+j} if U_{i+j} can become adjacent to U_i as a result of Grosz and Sidner's stack mechanism [Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Walker, 1996]. For example consider the contrast between discourses B and C below, where C is a constructed variation of B:[1]

(B)   (4) C: Ok Harry, I have a problem that uh my - with today's economy *my daughter is working*,
       (5) H: I missed your name.
       (6) C: Hank.

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[1]This dialogue is from a corpus of naturally occurring financial advice dialogues [Pollack *et al.*, 1982] that were originally taped from a live radio broadcast and transcribed by Martha Pollack and Julia Hirschberg. I am grateful to Julia Hirschberg for providing me with audio tapes of these dialogues.

(7) H: Go ahead Hank
(8a) C: *as well as her uh husband*.
(8b) They have a child.
(8c) and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting.

(C)   (4) C: Ok Harry, I have a problem that uh my - with today's economy *my daughter is working*,
(5) H: I missed your name.
(6) C: Hank.
H: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.
C: Hank.
H: Is that H A N K?
C: Yes.
(7) H: Go ahead Hank.
(8a) C: *as well as her uh husband*.
(8b) They have a child.
(8c) and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting.

In utterance 5 of dialogue B, the talk show host, H, interrupts the caller C to ask for his name. In utterance 8a, the caller C continues the problem statement that he began with utterance 4 as though utterance 4 had just been said, and so utterance 8a is part of the same discourse segment as utterance 4. The structure of Dialogue C is identical to that of B.

But if utterance 8a is in the same segment as utterance 4 in both dialogue B and C, there is an unexpected difference in the coherence of the utterance. The anaphoric referring expression, *her husband* is clearly more difficult to interpret in C. Thus hierarchical recency, as operationalized by the stack model, does not predict when previous centers are accessible.

I will argue that it is possible to simultaneously address these problems and integrate centering with a model of global discourse structure by replacing Grosz and Sidner's stack model of global focus with the cache model of attentional state [Walker, 1996].[2] In the resulting integrated model:

1. Centers are elements of the cache and the cache model mediates the accessibility of centers.
2. Centers are carried over segment boundaries by default.
3. Processing difficulties are predicted for the interpretation of centers whose co-specifiers are not linearly recent, as in the case of Dialogue C.
4. Granularity of discourse segmentation (discourse intentions) has no effect on the model.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the cache model and briefly describes how the centering algorithm [Brennan *et al.*, 1987] is integrated with the cache model [Walker, 1998]. Then, three types of evidence are used to support the proposed integrated model. First, Section 3.1 discuss quantitative evidence showing that centers are frequently carried over segment boundaries. Next, section 3.2 discuss a number of naturally occurring examples that illustrate that the form in which centers are realized across discourse segment boundaries is not determined by boundary type. Then, Section 3.3 presents evidence that the cache model can handle 'focus pops', a phenomena that was believed to provide strong support for Grosz and Sidner's stack model. Finally, section 4 summarizes the discussion and outlines future work.

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[2]The cache model is an extension of the AWM model in [Walker, 1993; Jordan and Walker, 1996].

2 The Cache Model of Attentional State

A cache is an easily accessible temporary location used for storing information that is currently being used by a computational procedure [Stone, 1987]. The fundamental idea of the cache model is that the functioning of the cache when processing discourse is analogous to that of a cache when executing a program on a computer. Just as discourses may be structured into goals and subgoals which contribute to achieving the purpose of the discourse, a computer program is hierarchically structured into routines and subroutines which contribute to completing the routine. Thus a cache can be used to model attentional state when intentions are hierarchically structured, just as a cache can be used for processing the references and operations of a hierarchically structured program.

In the cache model there are two types of memory: MAIN MEMORY represents long-term memory and the CACHE represents working memory [Baddeley, 1986]. Main memory is much larger than the cache, but is slower to access [Hintzman, 1988; Gillund and Schiffrin, 1984]. The cache is a limited capacity, almost instantaneously accessible, memory store.[3] The size of the cache is a working assumption based on the findings of previous work [Kintsch, 1988; Miller, 1956; Alshawi, 1987]:

> CACHE SIZE ASSUMPTION: The cache is limited to 2 or 3 sentences, or approximately 7 propositions.

Given a particular cache size assumption, the definition of linear recency, discussed briefly above, can be made more precise, by setting the number of linearly adjacent utterances to be equal to the cache size parameter.

> An utterance U_i is linearly recent for utterance U_j when it occurred within the past three linearly adjacent utterances.

There are three operations involving the cache and main memory. Items in the cache can be preferentially RETAINED and items in main memory can be RETRIEVED to the cache. Items in the cache can also be STORED to main memory. When new items are retrieved from main memory to the cache, or enter the cache directly due to events in the world, other items may be displaced to main memory, because the cache has limited capacity.

The determination of which items to displace is handled by a CACHE REPLACEMENT POLICY. In the cache model, the cache replacement policy is a working assumption, based on previous work on the effects of distance on anaphoric processing [Clark and Sengul, 1979; Hobbs, 1976; Hankamer and Sag, 1976] *inter alia*:

> CACHE REPLACEMENT POLICY ASSUMPTION: The least recently accessed items in the cache are displaced to main memory, with the exception of those items preferentially retained.

The cache model includes specific assumptions about processing. Discourse processes execute on elements that are in the cache. All of the premises for an inference must be simultaneously in the cache for the inference to be made [McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992; Goldman, 1986]. If a discourse

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[3][Cornish, 1999] suggests that the functionality of the cache as described here is similar to Sanford and Garrod's EXPLICIT FOCUS [Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Garrod, 1995], and Kintsch and Van Dijk's SHORT TERM MEMORY BUFFER[Kintsch and Dijk, 1978].

relation is to be inferred between two separate segments, a representation of both segments must be simultaneously in the cache [Malt, 1984; Fletcher *et al.*, 1990; Walker, 1993]. The cospecifier of an anaphor must be in the cache for automatic interpretation or be strategically retrieved to the cache in order to interpret the anaphor [Tyler and Marslen-Wilson, 1982; Greene *et al.*, 1992]. Thus what is contained in the cache at any one time is a WORKING SET consisting of discourse entities such as entities, properties and relations that are currently being used for some process.

The integration of centering with the cache model is simple [Walker, 1998]. Centers are a subset of entities in the cache, and the contents of the cache change incrementally as discourse is processed utterance by utterance, so by default centers are carried over from one segment to another. The centering forward looking centers list for an utterance is a subset of the entities in the cache, and centering rules and constraints apply as usual, with the ordering of the Cf list providing an additional finer level of salience ordering for entities within the cache.

The cache model maintains Grosz and Sidner's distinction between intentional structure and attentional state. This distinction is critical. However the cache model does not posit that attentional state is isomorphic to intentional structure. For example, when a new intention is recognized that is subordinate to the current intention, new entities may be created in the cache or be retrieved to the cache from main memory [Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988], however old entities currently in the cache will remain until they are displaced. Thus centers from the previous intention are carried over by default until they are displaced. When a new intention that is subordinate to a prior intention is recognized, entities related to the prior intention must be retrieved to the cache, unless they were not displaced by the intervening discourse. In other words, the cache model casts attentional state in discourse processing as a **gradient** phenomenon, and predicts a looser coupling of intentional structure and attentional state. A change of intention affects what is in the cache, but the contents of the cache change incrementally, instead of changing instantaneously with one stack operation as they do in the stack model.

The cache model provides a natural explanation for the difference in the coherence between dialogue B and dialogue C. The CACHE SIZE ASSUMPTION in the cache model predicts that processing the longer interruption in C uses all of the cache capacity; thus returning to the prior discussion requires a retrieval from main memory. The success of this retrieval depends on two requirements: (1) the speaker must provide an adequate retrieval cue [McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992; Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988]; and (2) the required information must have been stored in main memory. In the case of dialogue C, either requirement (1) or (2) may not be satisfied.

The differences between the two models are summarized below:

- New intention subordinate to current intention:
  - Stack: Push new focus space
  - Cache: New entities retrieved to cache related to new intention, old entities remain until displaced
- Completion of intention agreed by conversants explicitly or implicitly
  - Stack: Pop focus space for intention from stack, entities in focus space are no longer accessible
  - Cache: Don't retain entities for completed intention, but they remain accessible by virtue of being in the cache until they are displaced
- New intentions subordinate to prior intention
  - Stack: Pop focus spaces for intervening segments, focus space for prior intention accessible after pop
  - Cache: Entities related to prior intention must be retrieved from main memory to cache,

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unless retained in the cache
- Returning from interruption
    - Stack: Length and depth of interruption and the processing required is irrelevant
    - Cache: Length of interruption or the processing required predicts retrievals from main memory
- Centering
    - Stack: No clear relationship between the focus stack mechanism and centering [Grosz and Sidner, 1998].
    - Cache: Centers are a subset of the elements in the cache and centering provides a finer level of salience ordering for entities in the cache.

3 Evidence for the proposed integrated model

Centering was formulated as a process that operates on two utterance U_n and U_{n+1}, *within a discourse segment D*, which attempts to explain the relationship between the form of referring expressions and underlying discourse processes [Joshi and Kuhn, 1979; Joshi and Weinstein, 1981; Grosz *et al.*, 1986; Brennan *et al.*, 1987; Grosz *et al.*, 1995; Walker *et al.*, 1998]. The hypothesis considered here is that the within-segment constraint should be abandoned. Furthermore, in the proposed integrated model, the cache contents, rather than discourse segment structure, determines the accessibility of centers.

To support the proposed integrated model, this section presents three types of evidence. Section 3.1 discuss quantitative evidence showing that centers are frequently carried over segment boundaries. Section 3.2 discuss a number of naturally occurring examples that illustrate that the form in which centers are realized across discourse segment boundaries is not determined by boundary type. Section 3.3 presents evidence that the cache model can handle 'focus pops', which were believed to provide strong support for Grosz and Sidner's stack model.

3.1 Distribution of Centering Transitions in Segment Initial Utterances

	Continue	Retain	Smooth-Shift	No Cb
Segment initial *now* sentences	2 %	20 %	39 %	39 %
Other Sentences	43 %	9 %	27%	21%

Figure 1: Distribution of Centering Transitions in 98 discourse-segment initial *Now* sentences as compared with a control group of Other sentences from (Hurewitz, 1998)

One way to see whether discourse segment structures have a direct effect on centering data structures is by examining differences in the centering transitions across discourse segment boundaries, which indicates whether centers are carried over utterance pairs that span discourse segment boundaries. The cache model predicts that centers are carried over segment boundaries by default because they are elements of the cache, but that the recognition of a new intention may have an effect on centering because it may result in a retrieval of new information to the cache. It also predicts that the degree to which centers are carried over or retained depends directly on whether they continue to be used

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in the new segment (because the cache replacement policy is to replace the least recently accessed (used) discourse entities). This means that discourse segmentation should have a gradient effect on centering.

Figure 1 shows centering transitions in 98 segment initial utterances, where discourse segment boundaries were identified by the use of the cue word *now* [Hirschberg and Litman, 1987].[4] *Now* indicates a new segment that is a further development of a topic, and indicates a *push* in the stack model [Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Reichman, 1985; Hirschberg and Litman, 1993]. This means that discourse segments that are initiated with utterances marked by the cue word *now* are either sister segments or subordinated segments.

The figure shows that centering transitions distribute differently for this type of segment initial utterance than they do for utterances in general. A similar distributional difference in centering transitions is reported in [Passonneau, 1995]. The No Cb cases in Figure 4 indicate that there are some new segments where centers are **not** carried over, but note that even within a discourse segment, centers may not be carried over from one utterance to the next. In addition, in about two thirds of the segment initial utterances, centers **are** carried over discourse segment boundaries, so that there is a gradient effect of discourse segment boundaries on centering.

These distributional facts demonstrate the need for a model of global focus that is integrated with centering, and provides support for the proposed cache model since centers are clearly carried over segment boundaries, and since there is a gradient effect of segmentation on centering transitions.

3.2 Discourse Configurations and Centering Data Structures

This section presents data showing that discourse segment structure does not determine the accessibility of centers. It is well known that accessibility of discourse entities is reflected by linguistic form [Gundel *et al.*, 1993; Prince, 1981; Prince, 1992; Brennan, 1995]. Furthermore, psychological studies of centering have shown that a processing penalty is associated with realizing the Cb by a full noun phrase [Hudson-D'Zmura and Tanenhaus, 1998]. Thus below the realization of the Cb (linguistic form) is used as an indicator of whether discourse segmentation has a direct effect on accessibility.

In order to show that discourse segment structure doesn't determine accessibility, we must examine the linguistic form of centers across all potential discourse segment structure configurations. This means we must define all potential discourse structure configurations. Figure 2 illustrates different discourse structures in Grosz and Sidner's theory and shows how segments consist of groupings of utterances which can be embedded within one another. These discourse structure configurations vary in terms of whether two utterances can be considered to be linearly recent or hierarchically recent.

In Figure 2, utterance A1 is both linearly and hierarchically recent for A2. Since the utterances before and after segment B are both part of segment A, utterance A2 is hierarchically recent when A3 is interpreted, although it is not linearly recent. Utterance B3 is linearly recent when A3 is interpreted, but not hierarchically recent. Similarly B3 is not hierarchically recent for A4. In the

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[4]See [Walker *et al.*, 1998] for the definition of the centering transitions of CONTINUE, RETAIN, SMOOTH-SHIFT, ROUGH-SHIFT and NO CB. In the data here, no rough-shift transitions were found.

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┌─────────────────┐          ┌─────────────────┐
│ SEGMENT A       │          │ SEGMENT C       │
│  A1             │          │ C1              │
│  A2             │          │   ┌─────────────┤
│   ┌─────────────┤          │   │ SEGMENT D   │
│   │ SEGMENT B   │          │   │  D1         │
│   │  B1         │          │   │  D2         │
│   │  B2         │          │   │  D3         │
│   │  B3         │          │   ├─────────────┤
│   └─────────────┤          │   │ SEGMENT E   │
│  A3             │          │   │  E1         │
│  A4             │          │   │  E2         │
└─────────────────┘          └───┴─────────────┘
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
Figure 2: Two abstract hierarchical discourse structures. The first has two discourse segments A and B where B is embedded within A, and the second has three segments C, D, E where D and E are sister segments contributing to the purpose of segment C. Utterances are represented as A1, A2 etc.

second discourse, C1 is hierarchically recent for both D1 and E1, but only linearly recent for D1. Utterance D3 is linearly recent for E1, but not hierarchically recent.

Linear recency approximates what is in the cache because if something has been recently discussed, it was recently in the cache, and thus is is more likely to still be in the cache than other items. Linear recency ignores the effects of preferentially retaining items in the cache, and retrieving items from main memory to the cache. However linear recency is more reliable as a coding category since it only relies on what is indicated in surface structures in the discourse.

Center realization over U_{n-1}, U_n	Sister intention Over D3,E1	Subordinate intention Over C1,D1	Focus Pop Hierarchical, Over A2,A3 over C1, E1	Focus Pop Linear, Over B3,A3
Cb = PRONOUN	Type 1	Type 3	Type 5	Type 7
Cb = FULL NP	Type 2	Type 4	Type 6	Type 8

Figure 3: Centering and Discourse Segmentation Possibilities

Given these terms, Figure 3 enumerates all the relevant discourse structure configurations. The columns of Figure 3 are the types of discourse segment boundaries that two utterances U_{n-1} and U_n can span in terms of intentional structure and linear and hierarchical recency. The rows enumerate differences in linguistic form that are known to indicate center accessibility, i.e. whether the $Cb(U_{n-1})$ is realized in U_n as a pronoun or as a Full NP. The combination of these two dimensions defines eight discourse situations.

Types 1 and 2 are utterance pairs that are linearly recent but not hierarchically recent because a related sister segment, e.g. segment D, has already been popped off the stack. Types 3 and 4 are utterance pairs that are both linearly and hierarchically recent. Types 5 and 6 are utterance pairs where U_{n-1} is hierarchically recent but not linearly recent. Types 7 and 8 are utterance pairs where U_{n-1} is linearly recent but not hierarchically recent, because an unrelated interrupting segment has been popped off the stack.

To test the hypothesis that segment structure does not determine accessibility, we must examine naturally occurring text or dialogue excerpts that exemplify each configuration.[5] The remaining sections each discuss two of the discourse types from Figure 3 using excerpts from the Harry Gross corpus [Pollack *et al.*, 1982; Walker, 1993], the SwitchBoard Corpus from the LDC, Phil Cohen's corpus of telephone-based dialogues between an expert and an apprentice who must put together a plastic water pump [Cohen, 1984], and excerpts from the Pear Stories Corpus from [Passonneau and Litman, 1993; Passonneau and Litman, 1996]. Centers are indicated by italics and discourse segment structures are marked by horizontal lines in the transcripts of the discourse.[6]

3.2.1   *Type 1 and 2: Sister intention*

Seg_i	U_j	
6	28	And you think "Wow,
		this little boy's$_i$ probably going to come and see the pears,
	29a	and he$_i$'s going to take a pear or two,
	29b	and then go on *his$_i$* way."
7	30	um but *the little boy$_i$* comes, (CONTINUE)
	31	and uh he$_i$ doesn't want just a pear,
	32	*he$_i$* wants a whole basket.
8	33	So *he$_i$* puts the bicycle down, (CONTINUE)
	34	and he$_i$ .. you wonder how he$_i$'s going to take it with this.

Figure 4: Excerpt from (Passonneau and Litman, 1994) illustrating Type 1 and Type 2. Each line indicates an empirically verified discourse segment.

A sister intention discourse configuration is shown in Figure 2 for segments D and E; E is a sister to D. The Pear Stories narrative in Figure 4 from [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] illustrates two sister intention discourse segments, with the segment boundaries marked between utterances 29 and 30, and between utterances 32 and 33.[7]

Consider the segment boundary spanned by utterance 29b and utterance 30. In segment 7, utterance 30, the full noun phrase *the little boy* realizes the Cb of utterance 30 [Passonneau, 1995]. The discourse entity for *the little boy* is also the Cb of utterance 29b and the Cp of utterance 30, so the centering transition is a CONTINUE. Thus, this is an example of Type 2 in Figure 3: the Cb(U_{n-1}) is realized as a full NP across a segment boundary for two sister segments.

Now, consider the relation between utterance 32 and utterance 33 spanning the second segment boundary. Utterance 33 is also segment initial, and the discourse entity for *the little boy* is the Cb, but in this case this entity is cospecified by the referring expression *he*. Here, as in utterance 30, the

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[5] See [Walker, 1998] for a specification of criteria used to identify relevant examples.

[6] There may be additional segment structure beyond what is indicated.

[7] Boundaries are those marked by a significant number of naive subjects in Passonneau and Litman's experiments.

discourse entity for *the little boy* is the Cb of the previous utterance, utterance 32, and the Cp of the current utterance, utterance 33, defining a CONTINUE transition. Thus, this is an example of Type 1 in Figure 3: the Cb of 32 is realized as a pronoun across a segment boundary.

Clearly, both Type 1 and Type 2 **can** occur and the Cb of an utterance can be continued by means of a pronoun in the initial utterance of a sister segment. Because a pronoun can be used in this configuration, there is little motivation for introducing an additional mechanism besides centering to explain the accessibility of the center over sister segment boundaries. The use of the pronoun here can be explained quite naturally by assuming that centering operates over sister segment utterances, represented abstractly in Figure 5 by D3 and E1.

3.2.2   Type 3 and 4: New subordinated intention

Seg$_i$	U$_j$	Speaker$_k$	
N	(32)	H:	If you'd like a copy of that little article
			just send me a note.
			I only have one copy.
			I'd be glad to send *it* to you.
N+1	(33)	C:	Where did *it* appear? (CONTINUE)
	(34)	H:	it- I - to tell you the truth
	(35)	C:	It wasn't in the newsp–
	(36)	H:	I don't remember where,
			what publication it was.
			It was not a generally public thing like a newspaper...

Figure 5: Excerpt from the Financial Advice Corpus illustrating Type 3. The discourse segmentation is based on assumptions about the structure of clarifications [Litman, 1985].

A new subordinated intention defines a new discourse segment embedded within the immediately preceding segment, as segment D is embedded within segment C in Figure 2. Figure 5 consists of an excerpt from the financial advice dialogue corpus [Pollack *et al.*, 1982], showing one segment boundary. This segment boundary is based on the assumption that a clarifying question initiates a new discourse segment [Litman, 1985]. Utterance 33 is a segment initial utterance that refers to the Cb of utterance 32 with the referring expression *it*.[8] Since this is the only center on the Cf, it is also the Cb, resulting in a CONTINUE centering transition. Thus, Figure 5 is an example of Type 3: utterance 33 shows that a Cb can be continued with a pronoun across a segment boundary where the second segment is embedded within the first.

Figure 6 is an excerpt from Cohen's corpus of task-related dialogues about the construction of a toy water pump [Cohen, 1984], with one segment boundary indicated. Here, the segment boundary is based on the assumption that a new subtask initiates a subordinated segment [Grosz, 1977].[9] This

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[8]Modulo the assumption that the article and a copy of the article are being treated as coreferential.

[9]In this part of the dialogue, the goal is to put the blue cap and its subcomponents onto

Seg_i	U_j	Speaker_k	
N	1	Expert:	Now take the blue cap with the two prongs sticking out
	2	Expert:	and fit the little piece of pink plastic on *it*. Ok?
	3	Apprentice:	Ok.
N+1	4	Expert:	Insert the rubber ring into *that blue cap*. (RETAIN)

Figure 6: Excerpt from Pump Dialogue Corpus (Cohen, 1984) illustrating Type 4. The discourse segmentation is based on the task structure (Grosz, 1977;Sibun,1991).

is an example of Type 4 because the Cb of utterance 3 is cospecified by a deictic NP, *that blue cap*, in utterance 4. In this case, the previous Cb is not predicted to be the Cb of the following utterance since the centering transition is a RETAIN, and this may be one factor involved in the choice of a deictic NP for the referring expression.

Clearly both Type 3 and Type 4 **can** occur. These types realize utterance pairs that are both linearly and hierarchically recent, and show that the Cb of the initial utterance of a subordinated segment can be expressed with either a full NP or a pronoun. Thus, it is plausible that centering operates over segment boundaries for subordinated segments, represented abstractly by the relation between C1 and D1 in Figure 2.

3.2.3   Type 5 and 6: Focus Pop with Hierarchical Recency

Seg_i	U_j	
14	1	a-nd his bicycle hits a rock.
	2	Because *he$_i$'s* looking at the girl.
	3	*ZERO-PRONOUN$_i$* falls over,
15	4	uh there's no conversation in this movie.
	5	There's sounds,
	6	you know,
	7	like the birds and stuff,
	8	but there.. the humans beings in it don't say anything.
16	9	*He$_i$* falls over,
	10	and then these three other little kids about his same age come walking by.

Figure 7: An excerpt from the Pear Corpus illustrating Type 5. Segment boundaries from human judgements taken from Passonneau and Litman, 1994

the main pump body. The rubber ring is a subcomponent of the blue cap. Thus putting the rubber ring into the blue cap is a subgoal of adding the blue cap to the main pump body.

Focus Pops are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. Here we are interested in determining whether the relevant structures for centering are determined by hierarchical recency or by linear recency of adjacent utterances. Thus, when a focus pop occurs there are two logical choices for selecting U_{n-1} for the purposes of centering, one choice defined by linear recency and the other defined by hierarchical recency. Types 5 and 6 select U_{n-1} by hierarchical recency. In Figure 2, the relevant examples of hierarchically recent utterances defined by focus pops let A2 be U_{n-1} for A3 and let C1 be U_{n-1} for E1.

Figure 7 is from the Pear Stories corpus, with discourse segment boundaries marked by human judges [Passonneau and Litman, 1996]. This is a naturally occurring exemplar of the first discourse in Figure 2; segment 15 is an interruption and segment 16 is a continuation of segment 14. This analysis is also supported by: (1) the obvious change in content and lexical selection [Morris and Hirst, 1991; Hearst, 1994]; and (2) the fact that utterance 9 is an INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UTTERANCE, IRU, which re-realizes the content of utterance 3, and reintroduces its content in the current context [Walker, 1993; Walker, 1996]. Thus, using hierarchical recency to determine U_{n-1} for the purposes of centering, U_n is utterance 9 at the beginning of segment 16 and U_{n-1} is utterance 3 at the end of segment 14. Then, Figure 7 is an example of Type 5 because a pronoun is used in utterance 9 to realize the Cb of utterance 3, despite the intervening segment 15.

Figure 8 is an excerpt from the Switchboard corpus in which the topic of the discussion was *Family Life*. The discourse segment boundaries shown here were identified on the basis of the claim that the cue word *anyway* marks a focus stack pop to an earlier segment [Polanyi and Scha, 1984; Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Reichman, 1985]. Utterance 5 in segment 3 starts with the cue word *anyway* and returns to the discussion of which sports the speaker's oldest son likes, after a brief digression about the speaker's little girl. Figure 8 is an example of Type 6 because this focus pop realizes the Cb of utterance 3 with a full NP, *my oldest son*. Note that no other male entity has been introduced into the conversation, so on the basis of informational adequacy alone, the pronoun *he* would have sufficed [Passonneau, 1996].

Seg_i	U_j	$Speaker_k$	
1	1	A:	What are some of the things that you do with them?
	2	B:	Well, my oldest son is eleven,
	3		and *he* is really into sports.
2	4		And my little girl just started sports.
3	5		Anyway, *my oldest son*, he plays baseball right now,
	6		and he's a pitcher on his team,
	7		and he's doing really well.

Figure 8: An excerpt from the Switchboard corpus illustrating Type 6. The topic of discussion was Family Life., Segment boundaries based on the cue word *anyway*

Types 5 and 6 are utterance pairs where U_{n-1} is hierarchically recent, but not linearly recent. The existence of Types 5 and 6 shows that the Cb of an utterance in a prior discourse segment (A2) can be referred to by either a pronoun or a full NP in the initial utterance of a return (A3). Since both Type 5 and Type 6 **can** occur, it would seem that popping alone does not make strong predictions about the realization of the Cb.

Seg$_i$	U$_j$	Speaker$_k$	
1	1	A:	Well, what do you know about Latin American policies?
	2	B:	Well, I think they're kind of ambivalent, really.......
			(23 intervening utterances about US support etc)
	25a	A:	Yep, that's about the lump sum of it.
2	25b		Well, um, I was speaking with a, a woman from,
			I believe she was from the Honduras or Guatemala,
			or somewhere in there,
	25c		No, she was from El Salvador –
	26	B:	Yeah.
	27a	A:	– and, uh, she was from a relatively wealthy family,
	27b		and when, uh, the Contras came into power, of course with, uh,
3	27c		oh, gosh darn, what's his face,
			he's in, in Florida jail now, Marcos –
	28	B:	Yeah, yeah.
	29	A:	– uh, no, he's, Marcos is Philippines,
	30	B:	Yeah, um, well, I'm blank [laughter] on it.
	31	A:	Well, you know who I'm talking about.
	32	B:	I can see *his* face (( )) forget his name [laughter].
	33a	A:	Yeah, I, I know it, uh,
4	33b		Anyway, when *he* came into power,
			he basically just took everybody's property, you know,
			just assigned it to himself.
	34	B:	Yeah, kind of nationalized it –

Figure 9: An excerpt from the Switchboard corpus illustrating Type 7. The topic of discussion was Latin America. Segment boundaries are identified based on the cue word *anyway*, INFORMATION-ALLY REDUNDANT UTTERANCES, and tense changes from simple past to present.

In section 3.2.3, we examined focus pops where U$_{n-1}$ for the purposes of centering was defined by hierarchical recency. In Types 7 and 8, utterance U$_{n-1}$ for the purpose of centering is defined by linear recency, where U$_{n-1}$ belongs to a segment that is popped off the stack before, or at the time that, U$_n$ is processed. The linearly recent utterance is analogous to letting B3 be U$_{n-1}$ for A3 in Figure 2.

The segment structures for both Figures 9 and 10, illustrating Types 7 and 8, are defined on the basis that the cue word *anyway* marks a pop to a previous discourse segment, as posited by [Reichman, 1985; Grosz and Sidner, 1986]. Thus in Figure 9, utterance 33b begins a new segment and in Figure 10, utterance 7 begins a new segment. However, in order to examine the effect of hierarchical recency, the beginning of the intervening segment that is to be popped must be identified. In Figure 9, utterance 27a in segment 2 is assumed to be hierarchically recent for utterance 33b in segment 4

based on the IRU *when X came into power* in utterance 33b [Walker, 1993]. In Figure 10, the tense change from past to past imperfect between utterances 3a and 3b is used to identify a discourse segment boundary [Webber, 1988b], so that segment 3 is hierarchically adjacent to segment 1.

Figure 9 shows a conversation from the SwitchBoard corpus in which two subjects are discussing the topic *Latin America*, as seen in A's conversational opener in utterance 1. The segment boundary of interest is that between utterance 33a and 33b. Segment 3, from utterances 27c to 33a, is about trying to remember the name of the leader of the Contras, and establishes centers for both the Contra leader and for the discourse entity representing his name. Establishing his name is a minimal part of the story that speaker A is trying to tell. Segment 4 continues the Cb of the Contra leader, and continues the story begun in utterance 27a, as shown by the paraphrase of *When the contras came into power with (the Contra leader)*. Clearly segment 4 continues the intention initiated in utterance 27b. Thus the focus space stack for segment 3 should be popped from the stack by the use of the cue word *anyway*. However, the use of the pronoun *he* to refer to the Contra leader in 33b would not be supported by the focus space for segment 2 that would be on the top of the stack after the pop, since segment 3 actually established this discourse entity as a center.

Figure 10 is also an excerpt from the Switchboard corpus. In this case, the topic of the discussion was *home decorating*. In utterance 7, speaker A marks a focus pop with the cue word *anyway*. But what intention is segment 3 related to? I identified utterance 3a as the last utterance of the hierarchically adjacent segment because the past imperfect tense is used in utterance 3b when the simple past was used for utterance 3a [Webber, 1988a]. In addition, it is plausible that on semantic grounds segment 2 provides background for segment 3 [Hobbs, 1985], and thus that the intention of segment 2 must be realized before that of segment 3.[10] Then, this is an example of Type 8 because the phrase *that color* in utterance 7 refers to the Cb of utterance 5 from segment 2, when the focus space for segment 2 should be popped off the stack.

Types 7 and 8 are utterance pairs where U_{n-1} is linearly recent but not hierarchically recent, because the interrupting segment has been popped off the stack. The existence of Types 7 and 8 illustrate that the Cb of an utterance in a 'popped' segment (B3) can be referred to by either a pronoun or a full NP in the initial utterance of a new 'pushed' segment (A3). Since both Type 7 and Type 8 **can** occur, there seems to be no basis for assuming that the centering data structures are directly affected by popping to a prior focus space on the stack. The occurrence of Type 7 is strong support for the cache model since there is clearly a change of intention between utterances 33a and 33b, but centers as part of attentional state are carried over and realized with pronominal forms that clearly indicate their accessibility.

3.3   Modeling Focus Pops with The Cache Model

Sometimes in a discourse, the conversants return to the discussion of a prior topic or continue an intention suspended in prior discourse. These returns have been called RETURN POPS or FOCUS POPS, in reference to the stack mechanism which pops intervening focus spaces [Polanyi and Scha, 1984; Reichman, 1985; Grosz and Sidner, 1986]. What characterizes FOCUS POPS is the occurrence of a pronoun in an utterance, where the antecedent for the pronoun is in the focus space representing the prior discourse, that is hierarchically recent. Thus it is commonly believed that this provides strong motivation for the role of hierarchical recency, and thus for Grosz and Sidner's stack model.

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[10]Thus it may satisfaction-precede it in the terminology of [Grosz and Sidner, 1986].

Seg$_i$	U$_j$	Speaker$_k$	
1	1	A:	Well, I was just looking around my house and thinking about the painting that I've done.
	2	B:	Uh-huh.
	3a	A:	And the last time that, um, we tackled it, I did the kitchen.
2	3b		And I had gone through a period of depression at one time and painted everything a dark, it was called a sassafras, it was kind of an orangish brown.
	4	B:	Okay.
	5	A:	*It* was not real pretty.
	6	B:	Yeah.
3	7	A:	Anyway, so the kitchen was one of the rooms that got hit with *that color*.
	8	B:	Uh-huh, I see.
	9	A:	[Laughter] So I tried to cover it with white....

Figure 10: An excerpt from the Switchboard Corpus illustrating Type 8. The discussion topic was home decorating. Segment boundaries identified by the use of the cue word *anyway* and tense changes.

In the stack model, any of the focus spaces on the stack can be returned to, and the antecedent for a pronoun can be in any of these focus spaces. As a potential alternative to the stack model, the cache model appears to be unable to handle focus pops since a previous state of the cache can't be popped to. Since focus pops are a primary motivation for the stack model, I re-examine all of the naturally-occurring focus pops that I was able to find in the literature [Grosz, 1977; Sidner, 1979; Reichman, 1985; Fox, 1987; Passonneau and Litman, 1996].[11] There are 21 of them. I argue that focus pops are **cued retrieval from main memory**, that the cues reflect the context of the pop, that the cues are used to reinstantiate the relevant cache contents, and thus, that focus pops are not problematic for the cache model.

As an example of a focus pop, consider dialogue E [Passonneau and Litman, 1996](figure 9):

(E) 21.1 Three boys came out,
21.2 helped him$_i$ pick himself up,
21.3 pick up his$_i$ bike,
21.4 pick up the pears,
21.5 one of them had a toy,
21.6 which was like a clapper.
22.1 And I don't know what you call it except a paddle with a ball suspended on a string.
23.1 So you could hear him$_j$ playing with that.
24.1 And then he$_i$ rode off.

In dialogue E, the sequence from 21.5 to 23.1 is an embedded segment. According to the cache

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[11]Fox provides some quantitative data on focus pops with and without pronouns, that show that focus pops with pronouns in written texts are virtually nonexistent [Fox, 1987].

model, the cache is not automatically reset to contain the information from the interrupted segment after the final utterance of an embedded segment. Thus either that information must be retained because there is an expectation that it will be returned to, or at some point after utterance 23.1, perhaps as a result of processing 24.1, the hearer must retrieve the necessary information from main memory to the cache in order to reinstantiate it in the cache and interpret the pronoun in 24.1.

In the cache model, there are at least three possibilities for how the context is created so that pronouns in FOCUS POPS can be interpreted: (1) The pronoun alone functions as a retrieval cue [Greene *et al.*, 1992]; or (2) The content of the first utterance in a return indicates what information to retrieve from mainmemory to the cache, which implies that the interpretation of the pronoun is delayed; (3) The shared knowledge of the conversants creates expectations that determines what is in the cache, e.g. shared knowledge of the task structure. I leave this last possibility aside for now.

Let us consider the first possibility. The view that pronouns must be able to function as retrieval cues is contrary to the classic view that pronouns indicate entities that are currently salient, i.e. in the hearer's consciousness [Chafe, 1976; Gundel *et al.*, 1993; Prince, 1981]. However, there are certain cases where a pronoun alone is a good retrieval cue, such as when only one referent of a particular gender has been discussed in the conversation. With COMPETING ANTECEDENT defined as one that matches the gender and number of the pronoun [Fox, 1987], Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 21 focus pops found in the literature according to whether competing antecedents for the pronoun are elements of the discourse model.

Competing Referent	No Competing Referent
11	10

Figure 11: Number of Pops with Potentially Ambiguous Pronouns

While it would be premature to draw final conclusions from such a small sample size, the numbers suggest that in about half the cases we could expect the pronoun to function as an adequate retrieval cue based on gender and number cues alone.

However, since representations (reference markers) for centers in the centering algorithm include selectional restrictions from the verb's subcategorization frame, we might reasonably define COMPETING ANTECEDENT to reflect the fact that the center's representation includes selectional restrictions [Di Eugenio, 1990; Levin, 1993; Cornish, 1999; Di Eugenio, 1998].[12] Furthermore, we expect that these selectional restrictions are used as retrieval cues.

Of the eleven tokens with competing referents in Figure 11, five tokens have no competing referent if selectional restrictions are also applied. For example, in the dialogues about equipment assembly from [Deutsch, 1974], only some entities can be bolted, loosened, or made to work. Furthermore, if a selectional constraint can arise from the dialogue, then only 4 pronouns of the 21 focus pops have competing referents. For example, the verb *ride* in dialogue E eliminates other antecedents because only one of the male discourse entities under discussion has, and has been riding, a bike [Passonneau and Litman, 1996].[13] Thus in 17 cases, an adequate retrieval cue is constructed from processing the pronoun and the matrix verb [Di Eugenio, 1990].

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[12]In fact in languages with zero pronouns like Japanese, all the information is contained in the verb subcategorization frame [Iida, 1992; Walker *et al.*, 1994].

[13]Fox proposes that lexical repetition is used as a signal of where to pop to [Fox, 1987], pps. 31,54.

The second hypothesis is that the content of the return utterance indicates what information to retrieve from main memory to the cache. The occurrence of INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UTTERANCES (IRUs) is one way of doing this [Walker, 1993; Walker, 1996]. For example, in dialogue F [Passonneau and Litman, 1996], utterances 4 to 8 constitute a separate segment, and utterance 9, which is the beginning of a focus pop, is also an IRU, realizing the same propositional content as utterance 3.

(F)   (1) a-nd his bicycle hits a rock.
        (2) Because he_i's looking at the girl.
        (3) ZERO-PRONOUN$_i$ falls over,
        (4) uh there's no conversation in this movie.
        (5) There's sounds,
        (6) you know,
        (7) like the birds and stuff,
        (8) but there.. the humans beings in it don't say anything.
        (9) He_i falls over,
        (10) and then these three other little kids about his same age come walking by.

IRUs at the locus of a return can: (1) reinstantiate required information in the cache so that no retrieval is necessary; (2) function as excellent retrieval cues for information from main memory. Figure 12 shows the distribution of IRUs in the 21 focus pops found in the literature. The fact that IRUs occur in 6 cases shows that IRUs are often used to recreate the relevant context. IRUs in combination with selectional restrictions leave only 2 cases of pronouns in focus pops with competing antecedents.

with IRU	without IRU
6	15

Figure 12: Number of Pops with Pronouns with and without IRUs

In the remaining 2 cases, the competing antecedent is not and was never prominent in the discourse, i.e. it was never the discourse center [Iida, 1998]. This lack of prominence suggests that it may never compete with the other cospecifier.

Thus, while more evidence is needed, it is plausible that the cache model can handle focus pops, by positing that a focus pop is a **cued retrieval from main memory** and that focus pops never occur without an adequate retrieval cue for reinstantiating the required entities, properties and relations in the cache.

4   Discussion

Centering is formulated as *a theory that relates focus of attention, choice of referring expression, and perceived coherence of utterances, within a discourse segment* [Grosz *et al.*, 1995], p. 204. In this paper I argue that the within-segment restriction of centering must be abandoned in order to integrate centering with a model of global discourse structure. I have discussed several problems that this restriction causes. The first problem is that centers are often continued over discourse segment boundaries with pronominal referring expressions whose form is identical to those that occur within

a discourse segment. The second problem is that recent work has shown that listeners perceive segment boundaries at various levels of granularity and that segment boundaries are often fuzzy. If centering models discourse processing, it seems implausible that each listener's centering algorithm differs according to whether they perceived a segment boundary or not, especially as there is evidence that centering is a fairly automatic process [Hudson-D'Zmura and Tanenhaus, 1998]. The third issue is that even for utterances within a discourse segment, there are strong contrasts between utterances that are adjacent within a segment because they are hierarchically recent and utterances that are adjacent within a segment and also linearly recent.

This paper argues that an integrated model of centering and global focus can be defined that eliminates these problems by replacing Grosz and Sidner's stack model of attentional state, with an alternate model, the cache model [Walker, 1996; Walker, 1993]. In the cache model, centering applies to discourse entities in the cache, and the contents of the cache can be affected by the recognition of intention. However centers are carried over segment boundaries by default, and are only displaced from the cache when they are not being accessed. When a digression requires the use of all the cache, a return requires a retrieval from main memory to reinstantiate relevant discourse entities in the cache. Since this retrieval has some processing costs, the cache model predicts a role for linear recency which is not predicted by the stack model. The proposed model integrates centering with discourse structure defined by relations between speaker intentions.

To provide support for the proposed integrated model, I provide three types of evidence. First, I examine the distribution of centering transitions in 98 segment initial utterances. I show that that centering transitions distribute differently in segment initial utterances, and in particular that CONTINUE transitions are less frequent. However it is clear that centers are carried over segment boundaries, as the cache model would predict.

Second, section 3.2 examines every type of discourse structure configuration in order to explore the relationship between centering and hierarchical intentional structure. The data suggests that intentional structure does not define a rule that directly predicts whether a discourse entity will be realized as a full NP or as a pronoun across a segment boundary. Figure 9 shows that even segments that have been popped from the stack can provide a center across a discourse segment boundary.

Third, I show that 'focus pops' can be handled by the cache model by positing that they correspond to cued retrieval from main memory. I show how features of the utterance in which the focus pop occurs provide information that functions as an adequate retrieval cue from main memory.

These findings provide support for the cache model. Since centers are in the cache, they are carried over segment boundaries by default. In contrast, in the stack model, the focus space where the center was established has been popped off the stack. The cache model predicts a statistical correlation between intentional structure and changes in intentional state, which would arise because a change of intention can trigger a retrieval of information to the cache, as in the case of 'focus pops'. But in order for hearers to retrieve the correct information to the cache, either automatically or strategically, the utterance must provide an adequate retrieval cue [Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992].

The cache model is also consistent with results of other work, and with psychological models of human working memory [Kintsch and Dijk, 1978; Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Baddeley, 1986; Cornish, 1999]. For example Davis and Hirschberg proposed that rules for synthesizing directions in text-to-speech must treat popped entities as accessible and de-accent them [Davis and Hirschberg, 1988]. Huang proposed that rules for the form of referring expressions in argumentative texts must treat the conclusions of popped sisters as salient [Huang, 1994]. Walker argued that the cache model

explains the occurrence of INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UTTERANCES, IRUs, such as utterance 9 in Figure 7, as a way of providing an adequate retrieval cue for reinstantiating relevant information in the cache [Walker, 1996].

However a number of open issues remain. First, while previous work has shown that a processing penalty is associated with the use of a full NP to continue the current Cb [Hudson-D'Zmura, 1988; Hudson-D'Zmura and Tanenhaus, 1998], a full NP is used to continue the Cb in the examples of Types 2 and 6 (Figures 2 and 5).[14] Why does this occur?

One possibility is that the use of the Full NP is one of a number of potentially redundant cues that the speaker has available for signalling intentional structure, so that the choice of a Full NP or a pronoun is not determined solely by the current attentional state [Fox, 1987; Yeh, 1995; Passonneau, 1996].

A second possibility is the Full NP is used to signal the rhetorical relation of contrast [Fox, 1987; Mann and Thompson, 1987; Hobbs, 1985]. This would explain the use of a Full NP for both Type 2 (Figure 4) and Type 6 (Figure 8), and unify these two cases with observations by [Fox, 1987] and by [Di Eugenio, 1998]. In Figure 4, a contrastive relation between utterances 29 and 30 is indicated by *but*. These segments contrast with one another by presenting alternate possible worlds of what **might** have happened with what **did** happen. In Figure 4, the NP *my oldest son* is an example of Left-Dislocation [Prince, 1985], i.e the discourse entity realized as *my oldest son* is realized in an initial phrase, and then again by the pronoun *he* in subject position. One function of Left-Dislocation is to mark an entity as already evoked in the discourse or in a salient set relation to something evoked, and contrast is inferred from the marking of a salient set relation [Prince, 1986]. Note that if contrast is determining the use of the full NP, we expect overspecified NPs to occur just as frequently within discourse segments as in segment initial utterances.

Finally, future work should investigate what constitutes an adequate retrieval cue for focus pops and how a speaker's choices about the forms of referring expressions interacts with other retrieval cues, such as propositional information. In order to do this, it would be useful to have a large corpus of data tagged for intentional or rhetorical structure.

A larger tagged corpus would also allow us to go beyond the study here, which simply showed that intentional structures do not appear to define a rule that determines the accessibility of centers. More data on the **frequency** with which various forms of referring expressions are chosen in different situations would be useful. [Walker and Whittaker, 1990] showed that in mixed-initiative dialogues, pronominal forms were more likely to cross discourse segment boundaries when one speaker interrupted the other than when transitions between segments were negotiated between the conversants. [Passonneau, 1995] discusses the frequency with which Full NPs are used to realize entities currently salient in the discourse. [Brennan, 1998] shows that speakers are about twice as likely to use a full NP rather than a pronoun if an utterance intervenes between the pronoun and its antecedent in the discourse, and that pronouns and full NPs are equally likely in the same situation when there is no intervening utterance. More data of this type would be useful in defining algorithms for the generation of referring expressions, and for determining additional factors involved in the referring expression choice.

In conclusion, this paper presents a model that integrates centering with hierarchical discourse structures defined by speaker intention. The important features of the integrated model are that it: (1) explains the differences in felicity between Dialogues B and C; (2) predicts that centers are carried over discourse segment boundaries by default; (3) predicts a gradient effect of discourse segment

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[14]In the other cases a full NP is used in a RETAIN transition.

structure on centering as we see in Figure 1; (4) predicts that granularity of intention-based segmentation has no effect on centering; (5) predicts an increase in processing load for pronouns in focus pops; and (6) is consistent with psychological models of human sentence and discourse processing.

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